cy. The network of radio broadcasting, the general press and books produced under the supervision of Party-controlled agencies proved to be a mighty propaganda weapon during war with the French. In the anti-American war, this network was the main instrument of mass mobilization and prominently contributed to the final victory.'
A. Consensus and Authority Crisis

Without any notable modification, the experienced style of information and media handiing constitutes the basis of the indoctrination and propaganda policy during peacetime, as formulated by the Fourth Party Congress one year after the forced reunification:

"The press, new agencies, publishing houses, information networks, radio broadcasting, television, the cinema, photography and so on, must clarif y in a timely fashion the Party's fine regarding the important domestic and foreign events, contributing to the edification of socialisa patriotism, the respect and strict observation of Party policies, of State legislation and security regulations; increasing the industrious fervor of the masses; correctly and opportunely lead social
opinion ...'2

Le Duan, then General Secretary of the VCP, stressed the importance of the mass media " the activities of which play a very preponderant role on the cultural and ideological front" 3

What then is causing the current unpopularity of the information and propaganda network, transforming a once highly efficient instrument of Party service into a dysfunctional and alienating apparatus, which induces its audience to rely on word of mouth communication of clandestine rumors, underground black humor, and, since 1975, the widespread habit of listening to BBC and VOAbroadcasts, in order to stay in touch with the outside world and even Vietnamese realities?4 A brief explanation, which requires more elaboration, is that the wartime propaganda slogans and arguments closely corresponded to the interests and aspirations of the peasants and working class. According to a well-known communication theory,5 they would listen to Party propaganda, not because of its intrinsic content, but because of their own expectations: equitable land redistribution, exemption from taxes and obligations, abolition of dass exploitation, and so forth. As for the intellectuals, the socialist model of national development, free from neo-colonialist interference, was a reflection of their innermost dreams 6

Ironically enough, the postwar social reality gradually contradicted the Party image-makers' optimistic version. Their Utopian message contrasts increasingly with the grim reality of everyday lite in the country. As in the Soviet Union, this leads to a strange malaise called "formalism", "under cover of which whole sections of the society finally break loose from the control of the "top"; sham reunions are organized, as well as seances of indoctrination, which in fact only exist on papers, fake socialist emulations are shown off, Plan objectives are fictitiously over-fulfilled ...".' Before the CPSU's 27th Congress, Vo Van Kiet, the State Planning Commission's outspoken Chairman, had already acknowledged the communication gap between the media and the people:

"The fact that the press and the broadcasting network are always speaking of quota fulfillments while the existence of the working class is deteriorating and
The propaganda of the Party which was highly successful during the war periods contradicted the social reality of peace time.
Oct-Dec 1990	Indochina Report 3