In addition to these factors, the utmost importance must be stressed on a factor rarely recognized by the Communist rulers, namely, the population's growing exposure to new values which seldom conform to the official ones.14 The country's sudden unification, plus the mass emigration of hundreds of thousands of people (before and after April 1975) who, with their frequent communication and gifts to relatives and acquaintances back home, have torn the bamboo curtain apart. Nothing can now stop the devastating flow of Western goods and information from the free world. In establishing new standards for evaluating local products and services, the variety and quality of Western goods have made the population more conscious and less tolerant of the shortcomings and failures of the VCP's economic policy. Thus, increasing disillusionment with official values is accompanied by erosion of faith in the regime's ability to improve its performance. The cataclysmic price, wage and currency reform in September 1985, inflicted serious damage to the prestige and authority of the VCP ruling circle. Rising widespread discontent put inescapable pressure on the delegates of the people who, during the National Assembly meeting at the end of 1985, openly criticized the high officiais responsible for the reform, conducted totaily contrary to custom. Despite the police and the reeducation camps, Vietnam's communist rulers began to realize that they were no longer the omnipotent masters of the society. For the first Lime since the tragedy of the agrarian reform in 1956, the top Party leaders were forced to make public apologies." Yet firing incompetent officiais is not atonement. To avoid a complete communication breakdown with society, the re-establishment of some form of open
dialog is imperative. However with the media lagging behind the situation, none of the effusion and critique at the aforementioned National Assembly meeting was permitted to appear in any newspaper.16 The public information control apparatus seemed reluctant to relinquish its long-standing sway over the nation's mind. In this domain, the Party's determination to abolish "bureaucratic tutelage" stiil needed to be effectively implemented.
B. The Voicing of the Suppressed Truth
Quite surprisingly, the shock treatment was provided by a comrade-patient. Impossible to conceal, news from the CPSU's 27th Congress caused the most violent storm in the midst of Hanoi media. From Boris Yeltsin's report, to Gorbachev's dosing speech, glasnost constitutes the most invigorating breath of fresh air that the Vietnamese under communism have ever known. Published in Nhan Dan, the Party official daily, although not always in their entirety,17 the Soviet disclosures were followed avidly by the intelligentsia, Party members, and the population of important cities alike, and provoked a chain reaction within the socio-political environment.

On March 15,1986, a directive launching the "Criticism and Self- criticism" campaign was issued by the Central Committee Secretariat. In Ho Chi Minh City, where the authorities and Party leadership still maintained close ties with social dynamism, the media quickly seized the opportunity. Under the caption, "Contributing Ideas to The (forthcoming) Party Congress",18 Saigon Giai Phong's editorship welcomed letters, suggestions, and criticism from its readers. A daily founded
in May 1975, the Voice of the People Cominittee o f Ho Chi Minh barely escaped the com
mon disease of formalism, always lauding the positive aspects of socialist construction in the City and. the South. Its sudden transformation was fervently greeted by the population. During the first months of glasnost, so quickly was it sold out that it was almost impossible to buy one of its issues at the newsstand.19 Tuoi Tre, another leading newspaper, and the mouthpiece of the Vietnamese Komsomol in Ho Chi
Minh City, also increased its attacks against corruption, bureaucracy, and social
After the cataclysmic changes in 1985, the VCP leaders were no longer the
omnipotent masters of their society.
Oct-Dec 1990	Indochina Report 5