American war), Linh has expertly brought into play both the media and opinion to build up a new consensus which is a key weapon in the power struggle against his conservative opponents. With his allies, gathered about him are all the socio-political forces inimical to the established system: the anxious and jobless youth, the undernourished laboring population, the dominated and embittered rank-and-file Party members, the alienated and depressed intelligentsia, conscientious objectors, induding writers, journalists, veterans, delegates of the people, and so on. His coming to power is synonymous with the emergence of a new political environment, its legitimacy stemming from broader popular support. His next step of power consolidation will be reliant upon social movements and pressure to isolate the bureaucratic coalition hostile to his reform. These social movements will be Linh's chief means of communicating and imposing the Parus novel political message. However, this is a two-way interaction; in the process Linh and his team must espouse, or at least take into account, the aspirations of the population and accommodate the system to the social reality.

Meantime, the other side of the Vietnamese reality should not be overlooked. Despite recent purges and the dismissal of some high-level Party officials,12 the bureaucratic hierarchies and numerous members of the ruling elite still retain the key power positions 113 These established members of the privileged officiaidom and their arch-conservative patrons are mighty opponents of the restructuring process. The very reason for their survival forces the Vietnamese Nomenklatura to inhibit social change and cultural liberation. Contrary to the new openness, the concealment of the widespread famine in the North and the postponement of the Writers' Union's Fourth Congress indicate that the ideologically ossified apparatus remains the dominant force in matters of censorship and expression.114 One should also recall that the Party resolution of November 1987 on the management of artistic and cultural matters is yet another instance of the Party's determination to consolidate its control over freedom of mind and creativity.

The criticism and openness campaign has more or less incorporated some basic democra tic behavior patterns into the social fabric. In the more advanced sectors of Vietnamese society, particularly in the langer cities and among the more cultivated population, what amounts to a kind of consciousness revolution has occurred, however this does not extend to rural areas. An increasing number of the population have relinquished their former status of being mute, docile subjects and are now learning and starting to exercise their civil rights. Such radical mutation win certainly exert a profound effect on the regime for the simple reason that:

... Citizens in a civil society are less malleable and less subject to manipulation by the state than subjects under an authoritarian regime. And as society become less malléable, society and the state grow more interdependent, each gaining the power to lirait and influence the other.115

To put it bluntly, Nguyen Van Linh and his allies are doubly in jeopardy. To grant a little liberty and open the door just a crack may not be possible. The democratization process is not a safe game to play in a system loaded with unresolved issues and deep personal and policy conflict among the top authorities. Unfortunately, the launching of a process of cultural change cannot be halted at some preconceived lirait. According to Tran Bach Dang, a very knowledgeable reformer and adviser to Linh, "the trend of radical change is irreversible"116 Hence one can predict a corresponding radicalization of the conservative oligarchy and its clientele in a last ditch bid to defend their prerogatives. It may be too premature to jump to conclusions, but the next act of the drama could be a nightmare for Linh and his comrades due to the accelerated economic downfall and the dismal perspective of nationwide hunger. The General Secretary is not a miracle-maker. He is threatened by a highly probable economic and political failure for the sad reason that the system is too backward and chaotic to benefit from long overdue reforms. The cumula
Nguyen Van Linh and the reformists are in a dilemma: the democratization process is not a sa fe gaine to play.
Oct-Dec 1990	Indochina Report 19