nam marked by considerable political and ideological changes. The most unexpected one was Linh's veering, lending his hand to the repression campaign. With the volte face of its liberal wing, the VCP has become less tolerant, less flexible, and its repressive tendencies were especially strengthened by the crisis of Tian An Men and by the shock effects of the historical turmoil in Eastern Europe. Symbolic of a return to former bolshevik orthodoxy was the Seventh Plenum Resolution of the Central Committee which has made it clear that the VCP's leading role, namely its political monopoly, is still central to the political order.126 Admonishing Party members to adhere to the principle of party monolithism and warning them against the sin of bourgeois liberalism as well as political pluralism, the VCP was stressing its determination to inflict severe sanctions and penalties on any encroachment of its monolithic doctrine 127

On precedents from both communist and Vietnamese history, the response was predictable. But how can one explain the "turnabout" of Linh and his reformist faction? The answer is quite simple: in advocating glasnost and perestroika in Vietnam, the VCP General Secretary did not have the skill, the determination and the supporters within the party apparatus that Gorbachev had. As we have indicated, in espousing the nation's demand for freedom and truth and in provoking the opposition of his rivais, Nguyen Van Linh was in double jeopardy. It is clear from the retreat of the reformist faction and the hardening of the VCP's line that the dominant faction of oligarchie oldguards like Le Duc Tho and his clan has won the battle,12s and Linh could face a political downfall if he persisted in continuing with his trouble-making behavior. It is not the place to delve into the VCP's complex factional intrigues but it suffices to observe that Linh's efforts to reform the system have failed.129 This reminds us of Krushchev who learned to his sorrow that attempts by top leaders to revise the official ideology and to dismantle ossified organizational structures are likely to generate redoubtable factional opposition.

If Linh, Kiet and their circle have abandoned the match, the liberal upsurge in Vietnam and the corresponding democratic movement have gained an imposing momentum the influence of which has largely nullified the conservatives' counterplot to obstruct and restrain nationwide demand for civil rights. In this confrontation, the aforementioned Writers' Congress stood out as the crucial testing ground. Postponed again and again for unclear reasons,130 it was finally convened in the last week of October 1989 with the participation of ail members of the Writers' Union, an unprecedented event in the history of this highly bureaucratized organization.

The principal function of the Congress is to elect a Board and a General Secretary. In the past, nominations for the Board were voted by delegates, the Board then elected the General Secretary. At stake this time was the issue of open and direct vote demanded by the majority of all participating members to elect both Board and Secretary. As usual, the Party apparat under the supervision of Le Duc Tho a ttended the Congress tried to interfère with the voting procedures to "rig the elections" 131 But writers, as a united group, have publicly opposed interference from the top and the conservative ruling clique was forced back. In scoring this exceptional victory, democratic and liberal forces in Vietnam have learned to depend on their own strengths to impose the ride of the people and not of the Party. The creative elite also realized that it could exert considerable political pressure on the regime, frustrating the latter's attempt to restore the Union to its former role of instrument of Party control which holds a monopoly on ail official literary activity.

Having failed in its efforts to contain and intimidate, the regime returned to a policy of extreme caution with increased ideological and political vigilance. Another major attempt to set the dock back was the drafting and promulgation of the new Press Regulation in January 1990, tightening control of the media with many restrictions. Censorship was creeping back with warnings against incorrect inter
Despite the conservative backlash, it appears that the trend towards radical change "is irreversible "
Oct-Dec 1990	Indochina Report 21