A quarterly record of significant political. military and economic trends in Cambodia. Laos and Vietnam.
Number 25
Oct-Dec 1990
MCI(P) No: 31/1/90
lu No: 0217-8451
GLASNOST IN VIETNAM
LIMITS TO OPENNESS
PHUONG KIEN KHANH*
L-1 fter two years of "Glasnost a la Vietnamienne', which provoked a nation-wide renaissance in information and culture, similar to the 1956 "One Hundred Blooming Flowers" campaign, the communist party leadership decided, at the Seventh Plenum in August 1989, to restablish control over the media and other literary and artistic activities. The conservatives within the party hierarchy believed that the liberalisation campaign, launched by the party secretarygeneral Nguyen Van Linh, had gone too far. The public opinion and the intelligentsia were indeed asserting with more and more authority their newly acquired role of checking the party leadership and ils policies. It was also predictable that the shock effects of the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union led the Hanoi leaders to the conclusion that the mushrooming of new media phenomena and other forms of intellectual expression was "part of a larger scheme to subvert socialism in Vietnam". In this respect, the most significant attempt to set the dock back was the promulgation of the New Press Regulation in January 1990, which tightened control over the media. However, it is unlikely that the various manifestations of a civil society, which has begun to reemerge in Socialist Vietnam, could be eliminated during the current repression. It is in this troubling context that Indochina Report has asked Mr l'huong Kien Khanh, a Vietnamese sociologist, to give an assessment of the New Policy of Information and Culture, implemented by the Vietnamese communist leadership after the Sixth Party Congress in 1986. His indepth analysis constitutes a major contribution to the understanding of Vietnamese society, where irresistible pressures for change are currently at work. e
Information & Resource Center in coopération with the Hanns-Seidel-Foundation
History has reached a crucial turning point in Vietnam.
Introduction
E choing Gorbachev's reform campaign in the Soviet Union, an unprecedented turn of events has taken place in Vietnam. Unlike the blind imitations of Mao or Stalin applied to "agrarian reform" and "heavy industry" during the 1950s, the policy of openness advocated by Nguyen Van Linh and his allies is not simply a servile duplication of Glasnost and Perestroika, but pressures threatening the country History has reached a crucial turning point in Vietnam. In addition to a systemic crisis confronting the regime, the VCP has to face the no less dreadful specter of a consensus crisis pervading not only the population, the youth, and the army, but also attacking the faith of many rank and file party members. After Le Duan's death, the issue of power transfer has further affected the political climate already aggravated by the dismal results of the Third Five-Year Plan (1981-85). Meanwhile, bureaucratic immobility and corruption on a nationwide scale are undermining, not only the prestige, but also the efficiency of the VCP in its attempts to curb its decline.

After more than a decade of undisputed rule, traditional explanations are no longer valid. An entirely new way of thinking and explanation is needed to cope with the unbearable pressure for change. In this context, openness and renewed thinking appear to be the most radical measures to be adopted by the VCP since the time of its unhappy flirtation with freedom of the media and expression during the Nhan Van Giai Pham affair in 1956. Under a regime infamous for human rights violations and suppression of truth, suddenly with the backing of party bosses, the population, public opinion, writers, and the press began to reveal the hidden nature of a totalitarian system. Issues long kept behind closed doors that could split the VCP's unity, at first confined to economic administrative malins, have now invaded the ideological bastion, guardian of the system's very soul.

What is the meaning of Glasnost a la Vietnamienne? Are we witnessing the classic drama of tactical alliance between political factions and mass opinion in the power succession battle? Are the people and the intelligentsia mere pawns on the contending parties' chess-board, or are they taking advantage of the troubled interregum to make their voices heard? Is the media's liberation a device to check bureaucratic graft, or just another trick to dispel domestic resentment and deceive foreign observers? Was social communication introduced to provide the system with a self-regulating mechanism for the renovation process, or does it constitute an authentic indicator of mass participation in the remodeling of the power structure?

This paper will examine the impact of the new policy of information and culture upon the carrent historical mutation in Vietnam. It will attempt to assess the political significance of such a move in a regime where sharp constraints on public discussion of the country's problems are always rigidly maintained. In shedding a complementary light on their method of controlling and conducting the reform, in clarifying the relationships between Nguyen Van Linh and his cirde and the social components of their following, the paper will also contribute to the explanation and understanding of the emergence of a new pole of authority within the VCP.
PART I: A Crisis of Confidence
The Vietnamese mass media were not always guilty of inefficiency and redundanIndochina Report 2	Oct-Dec 1990
cy. The network of radio broadcasting, the general press and books produced under the supervision of Party-controlled agencies proved to be a mighty propaganda weapon during war with the French. In the anti-American war, this network was the main instrument of mass mobilization and prominently contributed to the final victory.'
A. Consensus and Authority Crisis

Without any notable modification, the experienced style of information and media handiing constitutes the basis of the indoctrination and propaganda policy during peacetime, as formulated by the Fourth Party Congress one year after the forced reunification:

"The press, new agencies, publishing houses, information networks, radio broadcasting, television, the cinema, photography and so on, must clarif y in a timely fashion the Party's fine regarding the important domestic and foreign events, contributing to the edification of socialisa patriotism, the respect and strict observation of Party policies, of State legislation and security regulations; increasing the industrious fervor of the masses; correctly and opportunely lead social
opinion ...'2

Le Duan, then General Secretary of the VCP, stressed the importance of the mass media " the activities of which play a very preponderant role on the cultural and ideological front" 3

What then is causing the current unpopularity of the information and propaganda network, transforming a once highly efficient instrument of Party service into a dysfunctional and alienating apparatus, which induces its audience to rely on word of mouth communication of clandestine rumors, underground black humor, and, since 1975, the widespread habit of listening to BBC and VOAbroadcasts, in order to stay in touch with the outside world and even Vietnamese realities?4 A brief explanation, which requires more elaboration, is that the wartime propaganda slogans and arguments closely corresponded to the interests and aspirations of the peasants and working class. According to a well-known communication theory,5 they would listen to Party propaganda, not because of its intrinsic content, but because of their own expectations: equitable land redistribution, exemption from taxes and obligations, abolition of dass exploitation, and so forth. As for the intellectuals, the socialist model of national development, free from neo-colonialist interference, was a reflection of their innermost dreams 6

Ironically enough, the postwar social reality gradually contradicted the Party image-makers' optimistic version. Their Utopian message contrasts increasingly with the grim reality of everyday lite in the country. As in the Soviet Union, this leads to a strange malaise called "formalism", "under cover of which whole sections of the society finally break loose from the control of the "top"; sham reunions are organized, as well as seances of indoctrination, which in fact only exist on papers, fake socialist emulations are shown off, Plan objectives are fictitiously over-fulfilled ...".' Before the CPSU's 27th Congress, Vo Van Kiet, the State Planning Commission's outspoken Chairman, had already acknowledged the communication gap between the media and the people:

"The fact that the press and the broadcasting network are always speaking of quota fulfillments while the existence of the working class is deteriorating and
The propaganda of the Party which was highly successful during the war periods contradicted the social reality of peace time.
Oct-Dec 1990	Indochina Report 3
The VCP leadership realises that the masses' seepticism of the media constitutes a greater crisis than economic failures.
becoming more and more difficult, is contradictory and unjustifiable. How could we expect the laboring mass to accept such speeches. "8

This is alarming enough for the direction of the VCP. A few months later, in a speech at one of those close Party reunions, Le Duc Tho was echoing the saure concern:
"The press, the radio network and the media are propagandizing without feedback, stressing only the strong points and the good scores, daring not mention the negative aspects, avoiding frank and open criticism, refusing to provide fidl answers to the questions of the masses ... On the contrary, il happened that the press was repeating about Plan fulfillments in the face of the misery of the
people. "9
As in other countries, this combination of social distress and flourishing panegyrics of party achievements has been a perpetual source of black humorists and underground poets. But for the resigned population, to quote a pertinent remark from Francoise Thom: "the contrast between the triumphant tonality of the media and the grim reality ended up by totally discrediting the official press".10

Anyone who has ever lived in Vietnam can easily tes tify to the common experience of "cognitive dissonance". If one cannot manage to become one of the'boat people", to escape the fate of the Pavlovian dog subjected to the paradox of the circle and the eclipse, one has to reject the whole environment of headlines and posters or pay mere lip service to the daily rituals of mass brainwashing. A quite accurate picture of the actual social malaise is offered by Nguyen Khac Vien, once an acclaimed historian of the revolutionary transformation in Vietnam:
"A dreadful silence is spreading over the society. Few people use their braira to discover a new ides. For some, time and energy are used up to making ends meet; others become depressed and pessimistic, too exhausted to take offense ".11

Vien's impressions mostly stemmed from his experience in Hanoi and North Vietnam, yet corresponded basically with those of Duong Quang Dong, a veteran Party member living in the South. An eighty years old retired official, Dong could be more honest in his words than the younger apparatchik:
"... There is a severe loss of failli among the people as regards the Party and the State, they are complaining about the sordid poverty and the rising prices, as well as about their precarious and insecure fille ... Although they fear the regime and the police, the people are frankand straightforward with retired men like us; in Ho Chi Minh City, they are not enthusiastic about the neighborhood solidarity tell meetings, they feel bored when listening to political speeches. "12

This means the demise of the pre-established harmony between the VCP and the Vietnamese people, and a lethal blow to the monolithic orthodoxy. Faithful followers of the bolsheviks of October 1917, Vietnam's communist leaders have confiscated the power from the people. In the name of the proletariat, it has imposed the Party's dictatorship on the entire society. This usurpation is legitimized by the bolshevik doctrine, according to which, the Party is the only authentic social consciousness that can rightly define the interests of society on behalf of historical necessity. For its legitimacy, needless to say, the Party answers to no-one.13

Yet perhaps deep down in its unconscious,the VCP feels uneasy about its self-investiture and is constantly concerned about the political climate of mass allegiance. In the eyes of seasoned communist leaders, the population's discrediting of Party propaganda, with society breaking loose from Party control, constitutes a current confidence crisis far more perilous than economic failures or natural disasters.
Indochina Report 4	Oct-Dec 1990
In addition to these factors, the utmost importance must be stressed on a factor rarely recognized by the Communist rulers, namely, the population's growing exposure to new values which seldom conform to the official ones.14 The country's sudden unification, plus the mass emigration of hundreds of thousands of people (before and after April 1975) who, with their frequent communication and gifts to relatives and acquaintances back home, have torn the bamboo curtain apart. Nothing can now stop the devastating flow of Western goods and information from the free world. In establishing new standards for evaluating local products and services, the variety and quality of Western goods have made the population more conscious and less tolerant of the shortcomings and failures of the VCP's economic policy. Thus, increasing disillusionment with official values is accompanied by erosion of faith in the regime's ability to improve its performance. The cataclysmic price, wage and currency reform in September 1985, inflicted serious damage to the prestige and authority of the VCP ruling circle. Rising widespread discontent put inescapable pressure on the delegates of the people who, during the National Assembly meeting at the end of 1985, openly criticized the high officiais responsible for the reform, conducted totaily contrary to custom. Despite the police and the reeducation camps, Vietnam's communist rulers began to realize that they were no longer the omnipotent masters of the society. For the first Lime since the tragedy of the agrarian reform in 1956, the top Party leaders were forced to make public apologies." Yet firing incompetent officiais is not atonement. To avoid a complete communication breakdown with society, the re-establishment of some form of open
dialog is imperative. However with the media lagging behind the situation, none of the effusion and critique at the aforementioned National Assembly meeting was permitted to appear in any newspaper.16 The public information control apparatus seemed reluctant to relinquish its long-standing sway over the nation's mind. In this domain, the Party's determination to abolish "bureaucratic tutelage" stiil needed to be effectively implemented.
B. The Voicing of the Suppressed Truth
Quite surprisingly, the shock treatment was provided by a comrade-patient. Impossible to conceal, news from the CPSU's 27th Congress caused the most violent storm in the midst of Hanoi media. From Boris Yeltsin's report, to Gorbachev's dosing speech, glasnost constitutes the most invigorating breath of fresh air that the Vietnamese under communism have ever known. Published in Nhan Dan, the Party official daily, although not always in their entirety,17 the Soviet disclosures were followed avidly by the intelligentsia, Party members, and the population of important cities alike, and provoked a chain reaction within the socio-political environment.

On March 15,1986, a directive launching the "Criticism and Self- criticism" campaign was issued by the Central Committee Secretariat. In Ho Chi Minh City, where the authorities and Party leadership still maintained close ties with social dynamism, the media quickly seized the opportunity. Under the caption, "Contributing Ideas to The (forthcoming) Party Congress",18 Saigon Giai Phong's editorship welcomed letters, suggestions, and criticism from its readers. A daily founded
in May 1975, the Voice of the People Cominittee o f Ho Chi Minh barely escaped the com
mon disease of formalism, always lauding the positive aspects of socialist construction in the City and. the South. Its sudden transformation was fervently greeted by the population. During the first months of glasnost, so quickly was it sold out that it was almost impossible to buy one of its issues at the newsstand.19 Tuoi Tre, another leading newspaper, and the mouthpiece of the Vietnamese Komsomol in Ho Chi
Minh City, also increased its attacks against corruption, bureaucracy, and social
After the cataclysmic changes in 1985, the VCP leaders were no longer the
omnipotent masters of their society.
Oct-Dec 1990	Indochina Report 5
The dianging media climate alhnved for more frank criticism on a wider range of social and public issues.
negativism; especially in its mont ly special issue, Tuoi Tre Cuoi (Youth's Humor)2°

In May, not wishing to be left behind, Nhan Dan opened its columns to mass criticism of the system.21 The media climate was rapidly changing nationwide. Other important newspapers and magazines joined the fray: Lao Dong of the Labor Union,Dai Doan Ket of the Fatherland Front, Tuan Tin Tuc of the Vietnam News Agency, Hanoi Moi of the People's Committee in the capital, Van Nghe of the Writers' Association, and so forth. Last but not least, Tap chi Cong San, the Party theoretical review, started publishing fundamental articles on Party issues and regime difficul
ties 22

The breeze of openness has permitted the long suppressed truths to be voiced. Loosened controls and restrictions have provided the public with more accurate information and investigations on a wider variety of social issues; especially bringing the conditions of women, the peasants, and the younger generation to societys attention.23 Specific problems were aired concerning the decline of morale among the young people, such as the use of drugs, the high crime rate, the difficulty of getting a decent education or employment alter high school or college 24 However, the most fashionable topics were understandably corruption, embezzlement and the abuse of privileges among the officialdom.25 The revelation of such widespread negative behavior was aggravated by the issue of nu.merous reports and articles describing the impunity of members of the Nomenklatura protected by their Party or State apparatus 26 Ail in al], the picture revealed by the press was more than alarming, and bore witness to the downfall of a nation in every economic, cultural and socio-political sense.

Supported by Party leaders in Ho Chi Minh City, the press reform quickly gathered momentum and by the end of 1986 was accepted as a socio-political reality by the regime.

During the VCP's Sixth Congress, the role of media and the press was newly defined, with the top Party echelons having taken into account the ascending flow of democratization and the inescapable pressure of "facing the truth":

"The mass media must transmit the Party s Une and policy,provide in-depth analysis of news events ... The press is the Party's voice and at flic saine tune the re f lection o f the voice o f the masses. Today the rising overall level of knowledge of our people requires the press and other media to ensure truthfirlness, to enhance quality, to boost the mass standpoint, and to hei`', hten flic fighting spirit, checking flic simplistic, monotonous, hollow, cliche-ridden, and monopolizing attitudes (of flic mass media). "17

The Sixth Congress also stressed the need. to openly impart details of corruption within the ranks of the Party members and high officiais, through the press and the media 28 This was strongly enforced in June 1987 by a directive from the Party's Secretariat, prohibiting Party and State organizations to abuse or hinder the media's function to inform on behalf of Party and State secrecy.29

Another crucial media event in 1987 in Vietnam was the column "Things that must be done righ t away", which appeared on the front pages of Nlian Dan and other leading newspapers under the authorship of the new general secretary of the VCP. Impatient with bureaucratie inertia and corruption, and alarmed by the accelerated deterioration of living standards, Nguyen Van Linh serai-officially stepped onto the media scene with his newly ac quired au thority to declare war on graft and economic inefficiencies.3° This patronage bolstered not only the exposure, but also the prosecution of numerous corrupted officiais. Since the attack was launched from the highest ruling circle, we could assume that internat orders and monitoring on how to carry out the anti-corruption campaign were received by ail important in
Indochina Report 6	Oct-Dec 1990
stitutions of the system. The result was the beginning of a crackdown on an apparently unprecedented scale against the "negative phenomena" throughout the country All sectors of the mass media participated, particularly in the larger cities. For the first time, corrupt high officiais in the Party and State hierarchies - a topic formerly considered "tabou" - were specifically named and condemned. The whole process of investigation and prosecution was actively assisted by mass participation.

The torch of truth also shed light on the servile nature of the press and media, yet another taboo topic in Communist Vietnam. The media people's "auto-criticism" opened the hidden files on the VCP's totalitarian information policy and dogmatic censorship. According to Thai Duy, one of the outstanding figures of the Vietnamese press, there was much evidence of news expurgation in the reporting of serious socio-economic difficulties or controversial political events.31 Behind a smokescreen of acclaims and exaggerated praise profusely bestowed on exportation or Plan achievements,

...The press keeps turning its back to the immensely pressing issues of everdayli fe, often intention ally peoticizing, embellishing life which is a far cry from the picture presented by the press, the radio and television networks ...

...completely absent are news reports investigating social inequities, indicating the hypocrisy of the profiteers exploiting the sweat and tears of the working
people32

Nguyen Khac Vien was more explicit about the authoritarian pattern of communication and the suppression of the rights of the press:

Our press is not interesting because of its one-way character. It only transmits the message of the leadership to the people but it rarely publishes what the people want to say to the leaders ...

... We are now lacking in democratic practice because debates and exchanges of views are absent. The top forbids open speech, the base dares not express itsel f.33

From the editorship of Saigon Giai Phong, we have another pitiful confession, admitting that "in some circumstances, the daily has been an accomplice of falsehood, begetting illusion, and finally engendering loss of faith"34 This very confession frankly admitted that:

The daily often turns out poor and monotonous information which is restricted to a few limited topics. Occurring everyday from many fields of li fe, a lot of big and small events attract the mass interest and have a bearing on their welfare but are neglected by the daily that does not provide correct analysis to guide opinion ...

... News void of information can be read quite often. In the report of a meeting, for instance a People Committee's meeting, the message is always beating around the bush with information about the participating members, the agenda, the naine and fonction of the speechmaker, etc ... The meeting ends up with "success" ... As regards the actual proceedings, are they interesting or borin g, are there debates and argumentations concerning the welfare of the people, how the role of a representative institution is performed? - the news says nothing.

... Therefore the information provided by the newspaper is both insufficient and redundant. Lack of vital, necessary news. Lack of useful information in every message. Redundancy of inutile news ...3s
Previously taboo topics were now openly discussed by Hie official media exposing
corruption, injustice and maladministration.
Oct-Dec 1990	Indochina Report 7
hie media reform and glasnost process allowed the people to become a true citizenry, no longera subject people.
Great effort has been made by the press and media reform in Vietnam to remedy the situation. It has brought some undeniable amelioration to the media climate and helped clear up the unwholesome social environment: However staunch opposition to the press reform was waged by invisible members of the powerful Party elite, by ail privileged officiais of the ossified system, and by the ideologicai watchdogs as well. This proved to be a mighty coalition against the democratization process and the openness policy of the Party reformers.
C. The Re-Awakening of Collective Consciousness and its Foes
If Nguyen Van Linh and his team are the directors of the drama of Truth, its principal actors are the people. Despite general mass apathy, a large number of the population: rank-and-file Party members, the intelligentsia, military officiais, the rising young generation, state employees and large numbers of city people are more politically oriented and eager to support any move, even from the top that corresponds to their aspirations and ameliorates their condition. Always on the watch for the slightest sign of policy change, these experienced between-the- lines readers were more than excited by the turn-around of Soviet Party lire. Public communication of Boris Yeltsin's report revealing the abuses of the corrupt Moscow Party apparatus has had some electrifying effects in Vietnam. Despite its exaggeration, the following news report conveyed the climate of collective febrility pervading the population, particularly the intelligentsia, at that time:

... not only the capital but ail the provinces are closely surveying ail activities of the CPSU, reading attentively the Party Congress' documents, especially the report of Comrade Yeltsin's of the Moscow Party leadership. When Nhan Dan started publishing Yeltsin's report I was working in Hai Phong and Quang Ninh. Vie report was fantastic, fascinating, the Party daily was like a magnet and everyone was compelled to rend it. Almost ail of those who have read the report wanted to share their joy, to "stir" everyone's attention concerning the news ...

... Back to Hanoi, I could observe that coinrade Yeltsin's report was still the predominant topic of conversation among the people 36.
Such popular excitement was forceful evidence of irrespressible collective political consciousness patiently waiting for its moment of revindication. The campaign for criticism and openness enabled the former atomized society to communicate with itself - a process equivalent to a social revolution in the context of a totalitarian system. This quite incredible opportunity was immediately exploited by the dynamic elements of Vietnamese society. Broad popular participation in the discussion of the nation's problems became more and more frequent and tolerated. If the political reform was decided from the top, it was principally the grass-roots that effected its implementation. And during this process, more and more people who formerly viewed themselves as subjects were taking on the mentality of citizens. Let's quote again Nguyen Khac Vien to picture the new social reality in Viet nam:

In 1986, we hear everywhere: I object to this, I would litre to supplément or propose a way to correct il, this is right, that is wrong, such person has cominitted errors, another must step down from his office. The belly is still humigary but the braie is full of ferment and vitality. Then the ideas have bloomed, not only during the meeting, the propositions; opinion rnakes its apparition, not only among hal f a dozen people gathering around a streetcorner or on the ricefields;
Indochina Report 8	Oct-Dec 1990
but a very crucial step is made when opinion and ideas become manifest in the press, the radio and T.V. broadcastings, the theatre, the movies, the novels, in brief, in Hie mass media 37

This re-awakening of collective consciousness was accompanied by an overwhelming hunger for information. A long muzzled and passive society was learning to listen to, and to speak out its own concerns. This was evident from the long queues at new-stands or the crowds surrounding the street loudspeakers when an important event was taking place in the country. "Today, daily information is the intellectual food of the people, no less important than rice"3$ The emerging opinion was eager to act in imposing its views. Concerns were sot only addressed to the Party and the government to promote debate within the regime, but not without risk, attacks increased39 against the corrupt and the privileged. Gradually, a new consensus was built up around the Party reformers' main mottoes: "facing and speaking the truth" and "fighting against the negative phenomena".

It is also important to mention an implicit but essential composent of the resurrected consensus: the Vietnamese moralistic mentality imbued with traditional values and strongly influenced by the Confucian politicoethical mentality This could be an obstacle to a realistic re-examination of the nation's crisis; since that mentality could engender an easy illusion of self-righteousness, equivalent to a blind sport obstructing a lucid diagnosis of the countrys backwardness and liabilities. Be that as it may, glasnost has been a unique opportunity for the moralistic Vietnamese people to kindle a heated movement against corruption and im
morality.40

The following figures give an idea of the extent and degree of popular participation to the press reform and criticism campaign: from April 1986 to December 1986, the editors of Saigon Giai Phong received 3,161 letters from its readers 41 After the publication of the General Secretary's messages (from May 1987 onwards), mass support of the reformera' line augmented tremendously.

... Hundreds of thousands of people have sent letters and articles to the newspapers and radio broadcasting offices. During a certain week, Nhan Dan received eight thousand letters; at certain moments it has received 5,500 letters in a lapse of three days. On the incident of a direct or bullying his critics, Nhan Dan has received more than a thousand letters. Vie newspaper Lao Dong lias received more Chan three hundred letters with regard to Hie re-inspection case of the Food Service in Hau Giang ..42

Due to the populations active contribution, the social climate of lawlessness and power abuse appeared to have come under control. Media and opinion have elicited the involvement of the judicial and legal structures responsible for the investigation and prosecution of the culprits. The conference of the financial sector's inspectors held in Da Nang, revealed that some 14,590 cases were investigated during the year 1987, most of which had been brought to light through denunciations and letters of complaint from private citizens. These violations of state regulations, 90% of which faced legal action, were double that of 198643 In other words, popular demand has grown, as is evident by the increasing number of denunciations the official administration has been forced to follow up with.

When one remembers that not too long ago officials were usually protected by judiciary partiality the change appears impressive. Backed by the law, popular opinion has emerged as a mighty socio-political force, while the resulting consensus appears to express mass allegiance to the Party's new line. The positive interaction between the media and the people has been furthered by numerous meetings and conferences of newsmen and members of the media. Alongside openness, democratic practices and democratization appeared more and more at the center of
Daily information became the intellectual food of the people, no less important than rice.
Oct-Dec 1990	Indochina Report 9
However, the media's criticism campaign was met with fierce resistance by an entrenched power structure.
the debates44 In a very outspoken editorial,45 the orthodox VCP daily strongly advocated a broadening of democracy to promote the "renewal process".

The same editorial admitted that "for a long time, in many hierarchies, sections, Party organizations and governmental apparatus, as well as in the relation to the masses, there was a serious Jack of democracy". This was a sensational event because official spokesmen had never dared mention the word "democracy" openly in this way, due to its bourgeois connotations. Despite its deep-seated habits, the communist regime has apparently taken a giant step towards meeting the demands of the people.

However, there were also many flaws in the general picture. Things did not always run smoothly as they were supposed to, especially in Vietnam where the power structure was so deeply entrenched in the social fabric. In fact, fierce and efficient resistance and counter-attack greeted the media's criticism campaign. Cases of revenge or retaliation against muck-rakers were plentiful, while frequent attempts were made to stop legal investigations with gift or money.47 Furthermore, most of these moves were encouraged by powerful cliques at all levels of the system, even at Central Committee level. These protective "umbrellas" provided immunity to their proteges and subordinates who were at fault48 They were also able to thwart the reforms in order to salvage their status and privileges. In the sphere of the press, a few figures could illustrate this grim reality.

According to a high Party official, "there are 253 newspapers in our country and only about 30 of them are providing accurate information about the negative phenomena" 49 And the press was also quite unanimous in its denunciation of "interdicts" and "taboo zones", namely, the Nomenklatura and a number of untouchable Party elite cirdes5° According to one member of the press, it was difficult to liberate the press from the fetters of its control institution, those who dared follow the Party policy of openness to reveal the truth about the "taboo zones" were surely bound for trouble.51 Definitely, Party directives and resolutions alone could not change the regimé s problematic power structure. To win the battle against bureaucracy and corruption, Party reformers had to enlist other sources of support.
PART II: Intelligentsia and Ideologists: A Redefinition of Role
A remarkable event occurred in October 1987 when Nguyen Van Linh attended a well-publicized meeting with the cultural and artistic community to confront both the sorry state of literature and the arts, and to enlist the support of the intelligentsia.52 For the second Lime in thirty years, the establishment of frank dialogue between the leadership and the intellectuals implicitly implied that the most conscious Party leaders had recognized a communication crisis between themselves and the regime's myth-makers.
A. The Downfall of the Myth-makers
It is an acknowledged fact that under communist systems, arts and culture all share Indochina Report 10	Oct-Dec 1990
the saure fate. Thought control and doctrinal rigidity are common features of Soviet, Cuban, Chinese and Vietnamese cultural life. The results are poor artistic quality and the death of creativity, which in turn leads to the destruction of self-confidence, loss of identity, and deadly silence defiance.
At first glance, Party demands on the creative intelligentsia sound dear and positive: "Writers and artists must cultivate the Marxist-leninist Weltanschaung, the Party's lire and policy ... they must stay in close touch with the working mass, intensively participating in the revolutionary movements of the mass" 53 But its implication are not that simple. Behind the Party appeals for a revolutionary culture, the intelligentsia are in fact exhorted to produce high-quality works of art and thought to adorn the Party and impart toit an aura of intellectual respectability and legitimacy. In this process of legitimation, the role of writers, artists and cultural figures is preponderant for the fundamental reason that they are the modern mythmakers. Only they can give life and blood to abstract theories and political discourses. The irony being that the myth-makers are not free to express themselves while subject to the constant control of Party ideological watchdogs.

In fact, the cultural gendarmes in communist Vietnam have always exacted strict obedience and severely proscribe any unorthodox tendency. Succinctly, as Czeslaw Milosz observed, here censorship and other control mechanisms have a very welldefined goal: "the reduction of artists and scholars to the status of yes-men" M During the aforementioned meeting with Nguyen Van Linh, a very popular playwright frankly denounced this "tutelage of the mind", a totalitarian mechanism of thought control where "only one man is necessary to dear the mind for all, one ultimate head thinking for all heads", reminiscent of Andre Glucksmann's expression; "the Central Committee sieging the head". However, as in the Soviet Union or Poland, mind control and the censorship of cultural expression in Vietnam, is not solely the business of the ideological apparatus. Whenever necessary rude sanctions are applied and police intervention called in .56
The final product of intellectual terror is a "captive mind", a conditioned thin dng system that has internalized censorship and practices it against its own integrity. One Vietnamese writer, among many other colleagues, confessed that fear has become part of their nature. "Fear pervades from the top, from around us and from inside ourselves. Before we exhibit our writing, we have already done the censor's job, cutting away all thorny issues for fear that the product may seem problematic" 57 A more honest as well as talented storyteller did not hesitate to describe the process of "self-debasement" to which many of his creative friends have succumbed 5s

In addition to this humiliating experience, we should mention its debilitating effect upon the intellectual and creative faculties of the Vietnamese artists, writers, and scholars according to an internai logic already studied by Czeslaw Milosz: "What is not expressed does not exist. Therefore if one forbids men to explore the depths of human nature, one destroys in them the urge to make such explorations; and the depths in themselves slowly become unreal" sy So the inescapable fate of the artistic and cultural life in Vietnam can be easily predicted after the downfall of its myth-makers. Answering a corresponding concern of the General Secretary, the Vietnamese cultural elites readily acknowledged "the poor state of our arts and letters, as poor and backward as our country today" 60

Just five years after the communist mastery of the whole country, an identity crisis was attacking the artistic community. "From diverse pressures, certain persons are denying themselves, abolishing the dividing lire between revolution and counterrevolution"61 However, Party directives are powerless against the process of ego disintegration. Before the Third Congress of the Writers' Association in 1983, both top Party authorities and high officiais in the creative domain were well aware of the profound crisis numerous writers were undergoing, the young especially.62
In communist Vietnam, writers, artists and cultural figures play Hie role of myth-makers, Hie modern "Yes-men ".
Oct-Dec 1990	Indochina Report 11
The debate between truth and literature is summed up as: "Hal f a loa f of bread is still a bread, but hal f the truth is a lie".
The ideological cadres then began to realize that the situation was critical. Despite many exhortations and mobilization campaigns, apathy and creative paralysis were permeating the whole cultural atmosphere. By February 1985, Ha Xuan Truong, a Central Committee Member having high responsibihty in the artistic and cultural domain, could only admit that "among the majority of the writers, not to mention the totality of the writers, is pervading a mental state of reservation, of loss of confidence ..." 63 This very orthodox Party ideological apparatus also recognized for the first time in his long-standing battre for the infallibility of dogmatic truth, that myth-makers could be "submerged by the gigantic and complex reality"64

In Vietnam, not only reality deviates from orthodoxy, in fart, the history of intellectual resistance against Maoist-Stalinist methods of brainwashing is extensive. From the famous affair of Nhan Van Giai Pham, to the tribulations,of dissident poets and writers, such as Nguyen Chi Thien and Doan Quoc Sy,' thought control has never succeeded in imposing its strict limits on cultural lite. Apart from outright opposition, a not insignificant number of the literary elite have been now and then at odds with the official "correct path". The fart that poli tical leaders, rather than writers or literary critics, have had crucial say in determining the appropriateness of creative works, has persistently created tension between the "engineers of human souls" and ideological bureaucrats. By the end of the 1970s, rising public expression of discontent in the artistic and literary world indicated the growing scope of unorthodox ferment.

Members of the up and coming generation of writers and critics, such as Hoang Ngoc Hien, Nguyen Van Hanh, Nguyen Minh Chau, and Duong Thu Huong questioned the basic tenets of "socialist realism"66 Other veterans, such as Nguyen Dinh Thi and Hoang Cam, turned to circulation of samizdat 67 In botte the North and the South underground writing and artistic activities audaciously defied the cultural gendarmes68

Thus the task for the Party reformers is twofold. On the one hand, they must "recuperate" the dissenting literary momentum, on the other they must revitalize the dispirited army of mythmakers and soul-engineers.
B. The Crying Reality

By the end of the "1970s", opponents of "socialist realism", such as Nguyen Minh Chau and Hoang Ngoc Hien, were reconsidering the limits and inadequacies of this official literary method to capture the complex nature of a nation in transformation, despite the dogmatic crackdown. A considerable number of the creative intelligentsia were also taking part in the controversial debate on the thorny relationship between truth and literature. "Half a loaf of bread is still a bread, but half the truth is a lie"69 has become the motto in the intricate polemics regarding the role of critics and writers in Communist Vietnam.

In September 1983, the Third Writers' Congress provided a public opportunity for many writers to re-examine the malaise of official literature. Hypocrisy, compromising attitudes and pusillanimity were factors that undermined the ethical and artistic integrity of poets and writers alike. Other factors which inhibited the freedom of creativity were the feudalistic mentality, dogmatic rigidity and institutional controls 70 Compared to the Second Writers' Congress that took place twenty years before (1963), the executive committee and the delegates were a lot more outspoken and daring this time.
Indochina Report 12	Oct-Dec 1990
This was not pure spontaneity That period was already marked by some significant literary events: the publication of Nguyen Manh Tuan's novel, Dung truoc Bien (In front of the Ocean) in December 1982; sponsored by the liberal Party leadership of Ho Chi Minh City this novel became a problematic best-seller, dissecting the corrupted mechanism of administrative tutelage in a fishing plant. It was preceded by Ma Van Khang's, Mua Mua Ha (Summer Rain), a powerful novel which provided an accurate description of the dam system protecting the Red River Delta threatened by graft and mismanagement, a topic that at the saure time is an issue constantly confronting the peasants and the regime in the North 71 Tuan's publishing house (Nha xuat ban Van Nghe in Ho Chi Minh City) and Khang's publisher (Nha xuat ban Lao Dong) would play an important part in promoting works of quality by talented and courageous writers. The publishing houses of the Writers' Union, the Women' Union, and the Vietnamese Komsomol: Tac Pham Moi, Phu Nu and Thanh Nien can be added to this encouraging list.

This somewhat relaxed atmosphere corresponded to liberal moves in the economic and administrative fields. In fact, the consequences of policy change since the VCP Fifth Congress constituted the Party pragmatists' overall liberalizing approach in dealing with the country's problems 72 Writers were given more leeway to convey some of the darker aspects of life and play the yole of social critics. The ensuing years, long before Gorbacheds glasnost campaign, saw a blossoming of interesting novels and short stories by writers of the American-war-generation such as Nguyen Minh Chau, Luu Quang Vu, Duong Thu Huong, Nhat Tuan, Tung Dien, and Trieu Xuan.

In 1985, both Nguyen Manh Tuan and Ma Van Khang reappeared with their respec
tive masterpiece, Cu Lao Tram (Island of Cajeput) and Mua La Rung trong Vuon (A Garden during the Fall) 73 Nguyen thi Ngoc Tu, the famous woman writer who had waited seven years to see her controversial first novel Dat Lang (Village Soil) accepted by the censorship cont ibuted another masterpiece to the cultural renewal - Hat Mua Sau (Seeds for the Next Year).74 Poets toc, were experimenting with original forms of expressions, seriously challenging the dull and empty voice of official poetry. Among the most innovative and fresh lyricists, Thanh Thao, Nguyen Duy, and Tran Manh Hao must be mentioned, although their poems were not always allowed circulation and often remained locked in the drawer.7

The intrusion of reality was even more remarkable in the theatrical domain. Aspiring young playwrights provided a striking insight into the rising social consciousness. In Ho Chi Minh City, according to official reports, sixty per cent of the plays written during 1983 dealt with current issues from every walk of life: peasants, army, student, city neighborhoods ... The majority of these (nine out of ten) were concerned with the social reality of the post-war period after April 1975. Despite some artistic awkwardness, these playwrights courageously depicted negative sides of "socialist transformation" in Vietnam76 This creative trend was reinforced in 1985 by the plays of Doan Hoang Gang and Luu Quang Vu, both talented and bold illustrators of bureaucratic stagnation and privilege abuses T7

This cultural thaw was not merely a side-effect of the VCP's new economic experimentation. It reflected some genuine receptiveness, if not willingness, of a fraction of the top authorities, especially those in Ho Chi Minh City, namely Linh, Kiet and their cirde, to coure to grips with reality; thus indicating that a totalitarian regime is not entirely immune to social pressures. More open minded than their arch-conservative comrades, Linh's team was also more attentive to the fortunes of society and considerate enough to lend a helping hand to outspoken critics of the system. The publication of "problematic" books, along with the performance of unorthodox plays, indicated a loosening of political and ideological constraints that corresponded to a certain reorientation of cultural policy quite long before the advent of Gorbachev's openness policy
The cultural renewal contributed to a blossoming of creative literary and theatre works.
Oct-Dec 1990	Indochina Report 13
Nguyen Van Linh encouraged the trend towards greater creativity.
Yet the real breakthrough occurred with the political mutation in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev's crackdown on bureaucratic immobilism had a tremendous impact on Vietnamese internai affairs and helped reduce the resistance of conservative officialdom. In the cultural and artistic spheres, dogmatic interference gave way to open debates and frank criticism. In the media world also, complaints and confessions revealing the life of the creative intelligentsia under ideological fetter were abundant and unanimous in their grievances against illiterate censorship and arbitrary bureaucratic controls78 Dishonesty, false consciousness, and fear of commitment were the most widely recognized foibles of the literati.

Before his death, Nguyen Tuan, the most prestigious cultural figure "de l'avantguerre" openly stated that poets and writers in Vietnam have avoided the truth, fabricating with their works a "false reality"?9 This statement was supported by similar experiences among the younger generation of conscientious writers such as Nguyen Thi Ngoc Tu, Duong Thu Huong, Nguyen Minh Chau, Nguyen Duy, Le Luu, Le Minh, Dao Vu, and Nguyen Ngoc 80 This spurious escapism was no perfect solution, as Nguyen Khac Vien related, "the writer wearing a mask becomes schizophrenic, living with two sets of values: one for himself, one for the society"81 Vien's remark found an echo in Pham The My's account from musical cirdes: "we can no more accept a fake existence. False consciousness, false expression, even
false creation..."82

The General Secretary's broad-minded gestures during his memorable meeting with the creative elite put an official seal of approval in their quest for truth and authenticity. Linh's motto: "facing and speaking the truth" legitimized the "problematic" tendency of those writers who wished to see and describe things as they were. He even encouraged them in their creative baffle against the dogmatic bureaucrats and frankly admitted that there were difficulties, obstacles and stubborn opposition to the policy of openness. But the highest authority of the Party system strongly supported sincere exposure and investigation of the country's issues by its writers, going as far as to define art and literature as necessary instruments of social forecasting.83 This is far removed from the orthodox picture of "engineers of the soul" - faithful obedient servants of the infallible Dogma. Poets and writers in Vietnam today can also use their talents to predict and shape the nation's future. Linh's intelligent political openness towards the artistic and cultural has facilitated the "recuperation" of nonconformist definitions of reality, thus reincorporating the critics of bureaucratic institution and ideological dogmatism into a new consensus in fine with the Party's policy of renewal and restructuring.

If the years 1986-1987 marked a turning point in the history of the Vietnamese press and media, they also witnessed a cultural blooming moderate in scope, but outstanding in quality and relevance considering the existing ideological framework. While Duong Thu Huong, Nguyen Minh Chau, Ma Van Khang, and Luu Quang Vu remained the foremost figures of civic morality and artistic vitality, the new stars of the period were Le Luu and Nguyen Huy Thiep. Luu's novel Thoi xa vang (rime long gone) relates the "education sentimentality" of a soldier with différent kinds of women, and paints a merciless portrait of the Vietnamese fair sex 84 Thiep's incisive short stories capture the rueful and demoralizing everydaylife of common City folk in a style reminiscent of Stendhal and Tchekhov85 Van Nghe, the literary weekly of the Writers' Union, which supported original talent such as Thiep, also featured interesting interviews and articles covering a wide variety of topics. Besides famous names, like Tran Van Giau and Nguyen Khac Vien, younger writers dealing with subjects previously taboo, such as the system's arbitrary and lawlessness nature or the exploitation and oppression of defenseless peasants were, published and ac
daimed86

Photography and motion pictures were also employed in the common effort to capture the true aspects of reality. During May 1987, an exhibition held in the capi
Indochina Report 14	Oct-Dec 1990
tal entitled "Hanoi, beautiful and not too beautiful" opened a new chapter in the history of photography in communist Vietnam. For the first time prosaic real life snapshots were publicly shown. Instead of a Potemkin-stage show, one saw scenes of traffic violations, or a man taking a bath in the garden cistern of a respectable Confucian temple 87
The movies had to wait a little longer to escape the grasp of censorship. 1988 saw the eventual release of film makers Tran Van Thuy's documentary, "Hanoi trong mat ai". Produced in 1983 and forbidden until 1987, it provoked an immediate reaction and was acclaimed by a dozen laudatory articles in the official press. If "Hanoi in someone's eyes" seemed a reconstruction of an idealistic past to implicitly condemning the anomaly and degradation of the present, Thuy's next production, "Chuyen tu te" (Living correctly) documented the human environment of today's Vietnam, denouncing the humiliating chasm between the privileged caste of high officiais and the people who exist in conditions of misery, disease, suffering, and death m

The field of social sciences also experienced a radical transformation of consciousness when scholars took heart and re-examined the conventional postulates concerning the national mentality and history. First-rate historians like Tran Quoc Vuong and Nguyen Hong Phong, offered a lucid analysis of the country's liabilities stemming from its long feudal past and backward agrarian mode of production 89 Another authority in this domain, Ha Van Tan, did not hesitate to criticize the demagogic stand of many of his colleagues who, apart from rudimentary errors in method and critical judgment, have presented a distorted vision of the village community which, according to those learned minds, had been the cradle of democracy a la Vietnamienne.90 Likewise experts in the field of behavior and mentality and psychology have reconsidered the taken for granted "good nature" of their folks 91 All in all, the intelligentsia is becoming more conscious and sophisticated in its awareness of the multi-faceted truth.
However, the crucial revolution in consciousness was undoubtedly the intellectuals' confrontation with the ideological apparatus, for the basic reason that the intellectuals were unable to bypass the thought control institutions in their efforts to promote a renewed view of the national situation. Those institutions, on the other hand, began waging a critical battle to retain their earlier unalterable and self-evident status against the intelligentsia's new awareness, which questioned the very reason for their existence.
C. Ideology and Renewal of Thinking
As has already been fflustrated, the reformera' new policy of information and culture has met staunch opposition from the conservative ranks, including the ideological apparatus. This is understandable because they did not want social change. The alliance between upholders of the status quo and dogmatic ideologists was a natural, as observed by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann.
... a profound af finity exists between those with an interest in maintaining established power positions and the personnel administering monopolistic traditions o f universe-maintenance 9x
Also ... those who occupy the decisive power positions are ready to use their power to impose the traditional definitions of reality on the population under
their authority.93
The Vietnamese intelligentsias real battle was against the thought control apparatus of the state.
Oct-Dec 1990	Indochina Report 15
In the battle for power in Vietnam today it appears that no one can
monopol ize and distribute the truth.
In the battle for power in Vietnam today, there is enough evidence to support and illustrate these theoretical propositions. However even more interesting is the challenging and questioning of the ideological apparatus by its former victims and accomplices: intellectuals, writers and scholars. That is no small accomplishment; in the course of a shared history, specific patterns of conduct are established and roles performed until they become taken for granted typifications. Ideologists are expected to provide political guidelines warning writers to stay on the correct path. Intellectuals are admonished to redress incorrect ideological outlooks, while artists and writers are advised to subordinate all personal inspiration and creative activity to the daim of political expediencies. As under other communist regimes, political criteria takes precedence over artistic criteria, thus in accordance with the Party authority structure, higher-level political officiais, regardless of their expertise and taste, are the final arbiters in philosophical, artistic, literary, and scientific matters
alike.94

Hence the troubled relationship between politics and culture is an inescapable issue. Writers and literary critics were unanimous in questioning the competence of the ideological apparatus, denouncing its political arrogance and dogmatic blindness.95 Although the intelligentsia pay formai homage to the orthodox postulate which accords the Party total authority over cultural matters, they nevertheless question the fundamental principles of Party orthodoxy. Writers and literary theorists flrstly expressed their doubts over the viability of "socialist realism", based on the lamentable results of the thirty year performance 96 Next they requested full creative rights, which would also allow for any errors that could arise in their search for truth.97 Some writers even went as far as to advocate the right to meditate upon spiritual aspirations beyond the earthly needs of the human souls98 Last but not least, the most highly respected amongst the Vietnamese literati exhorted the Party to re-examine the literary verdicts condemning the members of the Nhan Van Giai Pham affair, or to lift the censorship from artistic productions such as Trait Van Thuy's films99

The literati were not alone in challenging the ideological control. A growing number in the academic and scholastic world joined the battle against dogmatism and voluntarism. Due to the Party's new cultural openness, their sacrilegious ideas against the monolithic orthodoxy were no longer confined to "underground" cirdes, but gained access to the most authoritative official publications. Supporters of the renewed thinking policy requested democratic participation in the search for truth. Alluding to the examples of scientific discoveries, they reproached the control of individual creativity and opposed the standard assumption of collective wisdom:

"... we cannot replace the independent and creative thinking of the individual with collective knowledge and mass opinions ... Therefore, to really renew our thinking, with the participation of ail in the renewal,genuine freedom o f thought is necessary, no one can monopolize and distribute the truth, but everybody's quest for the truth is the very path to it "100

By bringing to light the process and the practical foundation of thinking, they also indicted the entrenched dogmatism and passive faith of Party cadres, and depicted the liabilities of such backward mentality as: fear of authority, underdeveloped independent judgment, sentimentalism, feudalism, and so forth. The debate was lengthy and complex, but the competent arguments of scholars and specialists were solid and competent and epistemically the ideological bureaucrats seemed to have lost ground. For the first time dogma and ideology appeared to be without defense in face of science and philosophy101 even when the holiest doctrine of Party omniscience was challenged:

"The praxis of our country, especially the praxis of more than ten years of
Indochina Report 16	Oct-Dec 1990
socialist construction along with the experience of the friendly socialist countries, has shown that the creation of the new stemmed front the creative actions of the masses and not from Party resolutions.102 Therefore ... under socialism, there is no basis nor justification of any kind, to prohibit the creative freedom of man. lire centralized leadership of the Party is established because of the need for democracy. There could be no correct thinking if one reverses the
proposition. "103
Eventually are we engaging in the battle for the final repudiation of ideology as the foundation of Vietnam's communie system and are we going to see it apparently replaced with democracy and freedom? This is ultimately the fundamental meaning of both the socio-political and cultural mutation in Vietnam today.

Until now however, the mutation has generally taken place in the reahn of ideas and articles. Recently a peaceful compromise has been reached between the control apparatus and the creative elite, when in November 1987, both parties were invited to study and discuss the new party resolution concerning the Party leadership's renovation in literary, artistic, and cultural fields.104 The resolution simultaneously and paradoxically advocated both freedom of creativity and Party leadership: "The nature of the right to free creation of the artists and literati is part of the revolutionary achievement under the leadership of the Party and is determined by the duties and responsibilities of everyone toward the Homeland and socialism" 105 While blaming the rudeness and arbitration of cultural bureaucrats and ideological watchdogs, one major aim of the resolution was the amelioration and consolidation of the Party's perennial institutions of cultural control. Despite some personnel change and a few open-minded words, the ideological tutelage system remained faithful toits totalitarian nature. Once again, we are the puzzled spectators of the communist trick of circle-squaring.
Conclusion
One can discern two fondamental aspects in Vietnam's new information and culture policy In opening the doors of the the media to mass participation, Party reformers intended to channel the pent-up energy of popular discontent into organized movements of social demand against the privileged and corrupt officialdom. Increased interaction between the media and growing sectors of society augmented the process of social communication and public discussion which has in turn initiated an apparently genuine democratization of the exposed population, mostly in the cities. The outspoken and more accurate press has contributed to clarify the configurations of social conflict and accelerated the polarization of consensus; opposing views stood out unmistakably during the impartial test of openness. The consequence of this tremendous momentum was an unprecedented socio-political reversai, which led to the deposition of Party old guards such as Truong Chinh and Le Duc Tho,106 and the election of a new core leadership around Nguyen Van Linh. Such an event would have been impossible without the emergence of new political forces able to challenge the stratified hierarchies of power. The most important indicator of this emergence was the preparation of the VCP Sixth Congress. It is an acknowledged fact that the leadership's draft of the party's political report to Congress was rejected by the majority of the rank-and-file. The final report, plus the resolutions of the Congress became principally the creation of the rank-and-file.107 According to Vo Van Kiet, the Sixth Congress was an unique event compared to its predecessors because of its severe criticism of both the Party and its officiais, regardless of their status in the hierarchy.108
So far Hie socio-political cultural changes have taken place
onl y in the real m of ideas.
Oct-Dec 1990	Indochina Report 17
Thus, due to the media campaign, the mass movements of social demand were monitored and evolved as a pressure supporting political change, which resulted in the promotion of a new Party leadership and the shaping of a new Party fine. The emergence of a new leadership was the culmination of popular objection, to the detriment of the old status quo, and can perhaps be compared to the early phase of the historical event that occurred in Prague in the Spring of 1968.

Probably civil society's intrusion into the political arena constitutes the most significant event in Vietnam in 1986. Until then, real social issues had always been obliterated by a false consensus fabricated by latent terror and the system of thought control. Popular participation to the campaign of media openness and liberation has introduced a new set of civic values and helped shape new patterns of interaction between the communist rulers and the people. One witnesses the stirring of social consciousness and the emergence of a social environment with a new type of citizen, no longer a subservient pawn, but starting to claim his own rights. For the first time under this famous totalitarian regime a relative atmosphere of freedom and democracy is pervading the country, with so-called unorthodox ideas or thoughts being tolerated and publicized. 'Me new reality is tangible primarily in the world of symbols and significations, "essential constituents of the reality of everyday life and of the commonsense apprehension of this reality".109

Vietnam's new culture and information policy is an imposing socio-political fact, while the joint efforts of the media, artistic community, scholars and intellectuals to refute the fiction of "the happy and perfect socialist country of Vietnam" bestows a fresh legitimacy to the emerging new social environment. The official political culture, molded by many generations of dogmatic theorists and orthodox ideologists, not only in Vietnam but also further afield in such places as Moscow, Beijing and La Havana, is being criticized, questioned and eventually replaced. In short, commonsense reality appears to have gradually overtaken Ultimate Dogma.

This socio-cultural change is more than a symbolic success for the people and the Party reformers. It in fact plays a vital role in the democratization process and radically transforms the system's voting and debating procedures, including those of its highest institutions: the Party and the National Assembly. It has made possible the ascent of Linh and his allies to the top, and has also remodeled the rituals of official ceremonies, be it a meeting between the General Secretary and his guests or, a debate at the National Assembly. The overall result is a progressive lessening of control and condescension from the top, and growing tolerance and concession for the people and their delegates.110 Another crucial aspect of democratization is the legal reform which puts into effect the popular appeal for exposure and legislation against abuses of power and privileges. The growing official concern towards crime and lawlessness reflects social pressure on the regime's inadequate legal and judicial institutions, forcing it to take sanctions against the corrupt officiais and their
patrons.111
Within the Vietnamese context, the global effectof the cul tural policy may be hailed as revolutionary. In terms of historical import, it has no equivalent. Actu.ally, we are perhaps observing the transformation of a totalitarian reality into a new political entity. Vietnam cannot become France or Sweden overnight, yet could it possibly be on the way to becoming a proto-democracy? 'Me ongoing democratic debate among the Vietnamese cultural elite is perhaps a premonitory sign of an emancipated future for the country and its citizens.

On the road to power, Nguyen Van Linh and his comrades have skillfully handled and mobilized the energies of popular dissatisfaction and social vindication. With his power base in Ho Chi Minh City, his widespread connections with the part apparatus in the South, and his long experience in propaganda and mass mobilization (Linh was the master mind of the NLFs propaganda machine during the anti
Indochina Report 18	Oct-Dec 1990
American war), Linh has expertly brought into play both the media and opinion to build up a new consensus which is a key weapon in the power struggle against his conservative opponents. With his allies, gathered about him are all the socio-political forces inimical to the established system: the anxious and jobless youth, the undernourished laboring population, the dominated and embittered rank-and-file Party members, the alienated and depressed intelligentsia, conscientious objectors, induding writers, journalists, veterans, delegates of the people, and so on. His coming to power is synonymous with the emergence of a new political environment, its legitimacy stemming from broader popular support. His next step of power consolidation will be reliant upon social movements and pressure to isolate the bureaucratic coalition hostile to his reform. These social movements will be Linh's chief means of communicating and imposing the Parus novel political message. However, this is a two-way interaction; in the process Linh and his team must espouse, or at least take into account, the aspirations of the population and accommodate the system to the social reality.

Meantime, the other side of the Vietnamese reality should not be overlooked. Despite recent purges and the dismissal of some high-level Party officials,12 the bureaucratic hierarchies and numerous members of the ruling elite still retain the key power positions 113 These established members of the privileged officiaidom and their arch-conservative patrons are mighty opponents of the restructuring process. The very reason for their survival forces the Vietnamese Nomenklatura to inhibit social change and cultural liberation. Contrary to the new openness, the concealment of the widespread famine in the North and the postponement of the Writers' Union's Fourth Congress indicate that the ideologically ossified apparatus remains the dominant force in matters of censorship and expression.114 One should also recall that the Party resolution of November 1987 on the management of artistic and cultural matters is yet another instance of the Party's determination to consolidate its control over freedom of mind and creativity.

The criticism and openness campaign has more or less incorporated some basic democra tic behavior patterns into the social fabric. In the more advanced sectors of Vietnamese society, particularly in the langer cities and among the more cultivated population, what amounts to a kind of consciousness revolution has occurred, however this does not extend to rural areas. An increasing number of the population have relinquished their former status of being mute, docile subjects and are now learning and starting to exercise their civil rights. Such radical mutation win certainly exert a profound effect on the regime for the simple reason that:

... Citizens in a civil society are less malleable and less subject to manipulation by the state than subjects under an authoritarian regime. And as society become less malléable, society and the state grow more interdependent, each gaining the power to lirait and influence the other.115

To put it bluntly, Nguyen Van Linh and his allies are doubly in jeopardy. To grant a little liberty and open the door just a crack may not be possible. The democratization process is not a safe game to play in a system loaded with unresolved issues and deep personal and policy conflict among the top authorities. Unfortunately, the launching of a process of cultural change cannot be halted at some preconceived lirait. According to Tran Bach Dang, a very knowledgeable reformer and adviser to Linh, "the trend of radical change is irreversible"116 Hence one can predict a corresponding radicalization of the conservative oligarchy and its clientele in a last ditch bid to defend their prerogatives. It may be too premature to jump to conclusions, but the next act of the drama could be a nightmare for Linh and his comrades due to the accelerated economic downfall and the dismal perspective of nationwide hunger. The General Secretary is not a miracle-maker. He is threatened by a highly probable economic and political failure for the sad reason that the system is too backward and chaotic to benefit from long overdue reforms. The cumula
Nguyen Van Linh and the reformists are in a dilemma: the democratization process is not a sa fe gaine to play.
Oct-Dec 1990	Indochina Report 19
As expected the conservative backlash was laundied in late 1988: there was a crackdown on media and public opinion.
tive difficulties are too monumental to be solved rapidly. Meantime his opponents await the propitious moment to strike. It might seem cynical to envisage, yet the specter that will one day haunt Vietnam's political arena may very well be Khrushchev's shadow.
Postscript: The Retreat of the Reformists

With some ironical surprises the dreadful prophecy has corne true within the past two years. As the policy of openness progressed, tensions began to develop. Determined to play a greater role in public affairs, writers and social thinker were asserting more authority and spoke openly of democracy and civil liberties. As intellectuals gained in stature and numbers, they began to push for further liberalizations or even to attack the regime, alluding to Maoist-Stalinist remuants and tendencies within the part itself.11 Public opinion, a phenomenon the VCP had previously underestimated was becoming more and more a political reality that not only exerted pressure in the regime but also began to re-examine the role and nature of the party.118 In creating a dangerous situation of polarization between the population as well as the intelligentsia that want ever more freedom and a petrified oligarchy ever more determined to fight back to maintain the status quo, the campaign of openness and thought renewal advocated by Nguyen Van Linh was bound to corne to a head.

Already since the famine of spring 1988 - just four months after Linh's meeting with the artistic community - there has been a discernible change in policy, the aim of which has been to contain media exposure of the famine."' The steadily increasing conservative trend was also reflected by the election of former arch-conservative Do Muoi to the post of Premier in June. However, the resolution of the regime to shift to a tougher policy was clear during the last quarter of 1988 when it decided to do away with the make-believe Democratic Party and Socialist Party, cancelling the publication of their respective liberal monthly Doc Lap and To Quoc; and to attack openly the famous literary weekly Van Nghe. In September 1988, following the closed meeting within the Writers' Union, the executive board issued a resolution explicitly condemning the deviationist trend of the weekly's publications. Besides its frank documentation of the country's major social problems,120 Van Nghe during the editorship of Nguyen Ngoc also gave expression to dissonant voices such as Nguyen Huy Thiep and Pham Thi Hoai.121 In this occasion, however, the classic technique of intimidation against certain chosen scapegoats with the object of terrorizing a whole community into submission has been useless. Armed with a new sense of identity and purpose, the embattle cultural and artistic groups strongly reacted nationwide. Associations of writers and journalists in important political and cultural centers like Hue and Saigon immediately issued petitions supporting Nguyen Ngoc, 122 a poet even went as far as to collect signatures to object against the repressive act, inaugurating thus a new mode of public intervention in Vietnam.123 After the resignation of Nguyen Ngoc, another leading literary monthly named Song Huong took over from Van Nghe the role of social and political critic in publishing devastating analyses and virulent repudiation of the regime's ideology 124 Subsequently, the offending publication was silenced after its last issue of September 1989, a couple of months before the Fourth Congress of the Writers' Union. This period also witnessed a general crackdown on media and public opinion, indicating the regime's will to stop all dissenting views and to return to more authoritarian ruling to curb the liberating influence of the intelligentsia on the eve of the decisive congress.125 In contrast with the enthusiastic days of reform and openness, these lead to a setback which announced a "post-Krushchev" era in Viet
Indochina Report 20	Oct-Dec 1990
nam marked by considerable political and ideological changes. The most unexpected one was Linh's veering, lending his hand to the repression campaign. With the volte face of its liberal wing, the VCP has become less tolerant, less flexible, and its repressive tendencies were especially strengthened by the crisis of Tian An Men and by the shock effects of the historical turmoil in Eastern Europe. Symbolic of a return to former bolshevik orthodoxy was the Seventh Plenum Resolution of the Central Committee which has made it clear that the VCP's leading role, namely its political monopoly, is still central to the political order.126 Admonishing Party members to adhere to the principle of party monolithism and warning them against the sin of bourgeois liberalism as well as political pluralism, the VCP was stressing its determination to inflict severe sanctions and penalties on any encroachment of its monolithic doctrine 127

On precedents from both communist and Vietnamese history, the response was predictable. But how can one explain the "turnabout" of Linh and his reformist faction? The answer is quite simple: in advocating glasnost and perestroika in Vietnam, the VCP General Secretary did not have the skill, the determination and the supporters within the party apparatus that Gorbachev had. As we have indicated, in espousing the nation's demand for freedom and truth and in provoking the opposition of his rivais, Nguyen Van Linh was in double jeopardy. It is clear from the retreat of the reformist faction and the hardening of the VCP's line that the dominant faction of oligarchie oldguards like Le Duc Tho and his clan has won the battle,12s and Linh could face a political downfall if he persisted in continuing with his trouble-making behavior. It is not the place to delve into the VCP's complex factional intrigues but it suffices to observe that Linh's efforts to reform the system have failed.129 This reminds us of Krushchev who learned to his sorrow that attempts by top leaders to revise the official ideology and to dismantle ossified organizational structures are likely to generate redoubtable factional opposition.

If Linh, Kiet and their circle have abandoned the match, the liberal upsurge in Vietnam and the corresponding democratic movement have gained an imposing momentum the influence of which has largely nullified the conservatives' counterplot to obstruct and restrain nationwide demand for civil rights. In this confrontation, the aforementioned Writers' Congress stood out as the crucial testing ground. Postponed again and again for unclear reasons,130 it was finally convened in the last week of October 1989 with the participation of ail members of the Writers' Union, an unprecedented event in the history of this highly bureaucratized organization.

The principal function of the Congress is to elect a Board and a General Secretary. In the past, nominations for the Board were voted by delegates, the Board then elected the General Secretary. At stake this time was the issue of open and direct vote demanded by the majority of all participating members to elect both Board and Secretary. As usual, the Party apparat under the supervision of Le Duc Tho a ttended the Congress tried to interfère with the voting procedures to "rig the elections" 131 But writers, as a united group, have publicly opposed interference from the top and the conservative ruling clique was forced back. In scoring this exceptional victory, democratic and liberal forces in Vietnam have learned to depend on their own strengths to impose the ride of the people and not of the Party. The creative elite also realized that it could exert considerable political pressure on the regime, frustrating the latter's attempt to restore the Union to its former role of instrument of Party control which holds a monopoly on ail official literary activity.

Having failed in its efforts to contain and intimidate, the regime returned to a policy of extreme caution with increased ideological and political vigilance. Another major attempt to set the dock back was the drafting and promulgation of the new Press Regulation in January 1990, tightening control of the media with many restrictions. Censorship was creeping back with warnings against incorrect inter
Despite the conservative backlash, it appears that the trend towards radical change "is irreversible "
Oct-Dec 1990	Indochina Report 21
Can the ruling clique of the VCP survive another decade of failures and disception?
pretations of freedom of expression and explicit condemnation of journalists who would attempt to "provoke popular insurrection" with their publications.1," A. further step to restore ideological discipline was the expulsion of Politburo member Tran Xuan Bach, an outspoken critic of monolithic centralism, af ter the Eigh t Plenum of the VCP's Central Committee in March 1990. The following two months witnessed the arrestations of dissenting personalities of the Popular Front such as Ta Ba Tong; other popular dissidents like Duong Thu Huong, Chan Tin, Nguyen Ngoc Lan were placed under house arrest.133
By finding it necessary to turn back much of the progress of reform, the regime has seriously once again damaged its legitimacy and public image. Always speaking about the construction of democracy and legality,13a while in the contrary manipulating to retain both hegemony and ideological influence, the ruling clique was in reality sabotaging the newly acquired consensus and losing the nation's allegiance, especially when it chose to rule by force. However, it is unlikely that the public institutions of a civil society which have begun to emerge will be eliminated during the carrent repression. The ideals of freedom, democracy and civil rights can never again be extirpated. A salient feature of open defiance to the répressive measures of the police state was the phenomenon of wide circulation of samizdat, unauthorized publications or informations. This new form of civil protest was mainly created by dissenting groups in the South, mainly in Ho Chi Minh City. Feeling betrayed by the retreat of Linh and his faction, veterans and former activists of the Resistance War in the South decided to act openly in the spirit of reform and democracy to secure the progress of freedom which, as many of them have realized, would not corne as a gift. Under the guise of conferences and meetings the Club of Veterans of the Resistance (CVR) was buildingupa tremendous poli tical movement of protest reassembling thousands of activists and supporters. It also issued a bulletin of information named Truyen Thong, clandestinely printed and dlegally circulated.135 As a large-scale organization with branches in many provinces in the South, CVR is now creating a growing political counterculture promoting a pluralist conception of the right of political expression and criticism, rejecting monolithic dogmatism.136 Calling for the rule of the people, it has won immense popular sympathy, not to mention the respect and support of overseas Vietnamese communities. Against rigid dogmatists and cynical pragmatists in the Party apparatus, its message is clear: The more you repress us, the more of us will rise against you. CVR has also engendered new movements of protest among religions circles and, especially, among the younger generations of high school and college students in Ho Chi Minh City.137 Despite some compromising gestures,'3R the regime seems more than ever reluctant to abandon its ideology and to humanize the system. Instead of political reform and cultural renewal, the old ruling circle of the VCP is clinging to doctrinal immobilism and ineffective methods of thought control.139 Entangled in enormous economic difficulties and internai conflicts, beset with nationwide restlessness and international isolation, will it survive another decade of failures and duplicity?
*	PhuongKien Khanh is a former research fellow atthe Institute of Social Science in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. He is currently undertaking research work on contemporary Vietnamese Iiterature
loweb
U	The main article was completed at the end of 1988. A postscript was written in September 1990.
Indochina Report 22	Oct-Dec 1990
NOTES

1. The importance of the press during the anti-American war is expressiy recognized by Nguyen Van Linh himself, through his experience as former chief of propaganda of the COSVN (Central Office for South Vietnam), cf. Nguyen Van Linh, "Nha Bao phai co Tam Long Cuong Truc", Nhan Dan, June 24, 1987.
2.	Tap Chi Hoc Tap, December 1976, p. 127. 3.	ibid., p. 83.
4.	Cf. Nguyen Van Canh, Vietnam under Communism, 1975- 1982, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, p. 155.
5.	The theory is named "selective exposure" by P.F. Lazarsfeld; cf. C.R. Wright, Mass Communication, (New York: Random Press, 1961), pp. 73-74.
6. Regarding the appeal of the myth of Marxist revolution in the Third World, cf. Peter L. Berger, Pyramids of Sacrifice, (New York: Doubleday, 1976), C.lll. For the eschatological dimension of Marxism, cf. The fundamental treaty of Mircea Eliade, "Le Mythe de l'Eternel Retour", (newiy revised and augmented edition, Paris: Gallimard-Idees, 1969), pp. 170 ff.
7.	Francoise Thom, "Gorbachev, Le Grand Communicateur", Politique Internationale, l'Hiver 1987-1988, p. 243.
8.	Tuoi Tre, December 21, 1986.
9.	Le Duc Tho, "Nhung nhiem vu cap bach cua oong tac xay dung Dang", Tap chi Cong San, May 1986, p. 13. 10.	F. Thom, op. cit., p. 243.
11. Nguyen Khac Vien, 'Thao go troi buoc cho Van hoc Nghe thuat", To Quoc, December 1987, pp. 1-2. 12. Speech to the VCP Sixth Congress, reproduced in Saigon Giai Phong, January 8, 1987.
13.	The logic underlying the ideology and the legitimation tactics of the Bolshevik is the subject of Helene Carrere d'Encausse's Le Pouvoir Confisque, (Paris: Flammarion, 1980), cf. Introduction and C.I.
14. The outstanding exception to the rule is exemplified by Le Duc Tho admitting that "through diverse channels, Western culture and ways of lite are influencing our society", cf. Tap chi Cong San, May 1986, p. 12.
15. A few weeks after the launching of the price, wage and currency reform, Nguyen Van Linh, then Party chief of Ho Chi Minh City, appeared on the television to make official apologies, admitting the appalling errors of the reform. This new behavior will be adopted by the VCP Sixth Congress.
16.	Cf. Thai Duy, "Bao chi phuc vu ai?", Dai Doan Ket, June 18, 1986.
17. Nhan Dan, February 18, and 19, 1986. Cf. extracts from Yeltsin's report. 18.	Sagon Giai Phong, April 2, 1986. Cf. also the following issues.
19. From the personal observation and experience of the writer of this paper.
20. Tuoi Tre Cuoi (Youth's Humor), is the most virulent monthly in Vietnam issued by the end of 1984. It is definitely the most popular and widely circulated newspaper in Ho Chi Minh City and the South - 290,000 copies each issue.
21. From May 12, 1986 onwards, Nhan Dan, started publishing letters and other readers' contributions to the criticism campaign.
22.	Cf. for example Le Duc Tho, op. cit.
23. Increasing divorce cases shed light on the present condition of Vietnamese women, cf. Ho thi Xuan Hien, 'Tinh trang Ly Hon thoi gian gan day", Dai Doan Ket, July 30, 1986, p. 11. Peasants, the forgotten underdogs, will be given more and more attention since food shortages are once again becoming the country's nightmare, cf. Le Dien, "May suy nghi ve dong dat que huong", Dai Doan Ket, January 15, 1986 or Tran Dinh Van, "Nong nghiep bao gio thuc su hang dau", Dai Doan Ket, August 27, 1986, among many other outspoken reports on the fate of the peasants.
24. Tuoi Tre, August 17, 1986 on drugs and young addicts; Tran Kim Thach, "Co che moi nhat dinh thang", Dai Doan Ket, January 1, 1986, and Tien Dung va Luong Duyen Tam, "Tai sao chat luong dao tao dai hoc va trung hoc chuyen nghiep gan day giam sut?", Dai Doan Ket, August 8, 1986, pointed out the defects and difficulties experienced by young students in high schools and colleges.
25. As an outstanding example cf. Tuoi Tre, May 27, 1986, which made public the dismal report on corruption in Ho Chi Minh City by Nguyen Van Thuyen, Head of the city's Department of Interior Affairs.
26. Cf. Thai Duy,"Kheo thanh co tat", Dai Doan Ket, August 10, 1986.
27. Tap chi Cong San, January 1987, Report to the VCP Sixth Congress, pp. 77-78. 28.	ibid., p. 83.
29. Directive no. 15, June 21, 1987, made public on September 25, by the official press.
30. Starting May 1987. under the initiais N.V.L., short articles and essays by the General Secretary were pubiished in Nhan Dan, and reprinted in important official daily papers such as Sagon Giai Phong, TuoiTre. An analysis of the political impact of Linh's writings was published in Tap Chi Cong San, July 1987, pp. 2931.
31.	Cf. Thai Duy, "Bao chi phuc vu ai", Dai Doan Ket, June 18, 1986, p. 4.
Oct-Dec 1990	Indochina Report 23
32.	ibid., p. 4.
33. Nguyen Khac Vien in an interview with the magazine Dat Vet, (Canada) cf. September 1986, pp. 31-32. 34. Saigon Giai Phong, June 6, 1986.
35.	ibid.
36. Tran Dinh Van, "Su that la Suc manh", Saigon Giai Phong, March 23, 1986.
37. Nguyen Khac Vien, "Cau chuyen eu moi", Dat Viet, (Canada, September 1987) p. 28. 38.	rbid., p. 29.
39. Cf. note 47 below.
40. As a respected authority on the history of Vietnam, Le Thanh Khoi, in a conference recently, mentioned the influence of Confucianism on current political thinking in Vietnam, cf. Doan Ket, Paris, May 1988, p. 22. Another pertinent analysis of the Confucianist mentality of Vietnamese intellectuals and communist cadres is to be found in Nguyen Khac Viens article, "Confuclanism and Marxism", Tradition and Revolution in Vietnam, (Berkeley: Indochina Resource Center, 1975), pp. 15-52. Cf. also notes 89, 90, 91.
41.	Cf. Dat Viet, (Canada, March 1987), p. 19.
42. Nhi Le, "Mot su doi moi nhieu hua hen cua bac chi", Tap chi Cong San, September 1987, p. 50. 43. Radio Hanoi, Mardi 6, 1988.
44. Cf. for instance Saigon Giai Phong, January 11, 1987 with the feature article on the media and press conference on October 31, 1987 in Ho Chi Minh City.
45. Nhan Dan, August 17, 1987.
46.	By contrast, official ideology constantly stresses the superiority of "socialist democ racy" which is a "million limes" better than bourgeois democ racy, cf. Nha Nuoc va Nha Nuoc Vo San, Hanoi: Su That, 1977, p. 23.
47.	Cf. Nhi Le, op. cit.
48. Cf. Le Gian, "Mot mat xich quan trong", Lao Dong, August 13, 1987. 49. Tran Trong Tan in Tuoi Tre, October 17, 1987.
50. Cf. Le Khac Thanh,"Mot ban chi thi day khich le", Saigon Giai Phong, September 30, 1987. Cf. also Luu Trong Van, "Van con do cac vung cam die, Tuoi Tre, October 31, 1987.
51.	Cf. Le Khac Thanh, cp.cit.
52. Cf. Van Nghe, October 17, 1987.
53. Resolution of the VCP Fourth Congress in Tap chi Hoc Tap, December 1976, p. 128 54. Czeslaw Milosz, The Captive Mind (New York: Vintage Bocks, 1981), p. 63. 55. Van Nghe, cp.cit. The playwrite is the rising star Luu Quang Vu.
56. An explicit exposition of police harassment against the intelkgentsia was provided by the gifted woman writer, Duong Thu Huong, during the meeting with Nguyen Van Linh. Her speech was not allowed in the official newspaper but was smuggled out of Vietnam and published in Vietnamese monthlies in France, West Germany and the United States. Cf. Doan Ket, (Paris, February 1988, pp. 34-35.
57. Nguyen Quang Sang's dedaration in the presence of Nguyen Van Linh was reproduced in Saigon Giai Phong, October 28, 1987.
58. Cf. Nguyen Minh Chau, "Hay doc loi ai dieu cho mot giai doan van nghe minh hao", Van Nghe, December 5, 1987.
59.	Czeslaw Milsz, op.cit, p. 215.
60. Such were the common opinions of Nguyen Khac Vien, Ho Ngoc, Nguyen Quang Sang during the meeting with Linh. Cf. Van Nghe, October 17, 1987.
61.	Directive 05 of the Central Committee on May 8, 1981 regarding the consolidation of the artistic and cultural organization and leadership.
62. In his letter to the inauguration of the Third Writers' Congress, Prime Minister Pham Van Dong expressed his concern about the "exhausted spirit" of the Vietnamese writers at the time, cf. Pham Van Dong, (with To Huu), Su nghiep van nghe va su mang cuir nguoi nghe si, (Hanoi: Su That, 1984), p. 16. Cf. also reports and speeches of the delegates to the Congress printed in Van hoc trong giai doan cach mang moi, (Hanoi: Tac Pham Moi, 1984), pp. 29, 33,134,138-139.
63. Speech before the Writers' Union Executive Board on February 5, 1985 in Da Nang. Cf. Van Nghe, March 2, 1985.
64.	ibid.
65. Nguyen Chi Thien is a famous dissident poet in Hanoi who succeeded in smuggling his manuscript out of the country and is now in jail because of his audacity, cf. Que Me, Paris, May 1988, p. 22. About Doan Quoc Sy, the Southern recalcitrant writer, and his tribulations from police interrogators to education camps, cf. the special issue of Van Hoc, (California, August 1988) and its many articles especially dedicated to the conscientious dissident.
66. Cf. Nguyen Minh Chau, "Viet ve chien tranh", Van Nghe Quan Doi, November 1978, pp. 110-115, and
Indochina Report 24	Oct-Dec 1990
Hoang Ngoc Hien, "Ve mot dac diem van hoc nghe thuat o ta trong giai doan vua qua", Van Nghe, June 9, 1979. A rich analysis of Chau and Hien controversial affair is provided by Nguyen Mong Giac, "Su phan khang cua van nghe si Viet Nam duoi che do cong san", Van Hoc, (California, May 1985, pp. 24-39.
67. The writer of this paper had read a samizdat copy of Thi's banned play, "Nguyen Trai o Dong Quan", circulated in Ho Chi Minh City in 1981. According to Amnesty International, poet Bui Hoang Cam was arrested in August 1982 "alter having allegedly attempted to send a collection of his verse, banned since 1958, out of the country". cf (Amnesty International Report 1984), p. 269.
68.	This will be a future research project for this author.
69. First formulated by Hoang Ngoc Hien in his article publislied in the People's Army daily, cf. Quan Doi Nhan Dan, July 6, 1980, the Russian saying became a choice morsel of word of mouth communication among the creative elite until ils re-emphasis in Duong Thu Huong's celebrated speech during the meeting with Nguyen Van Linh, cf. note 56.
70. Cf. "Van hoc trong giai doan cach mang moi", op- cit, especially the opinions of Bui Huy Phon, Vu Quan Phuong, Xuan Quynh, Thanh Thao, Nguyen Kien, Nguyen Khac Phe, pp. 212--219, 225-227, 235-236.
71. Both novels would later be awarded the most prestigious literary prizes.
72. About the liberation of the economic mechanism, cf. Vo Nhan Tri, "Vietnam: the Third Five-Year Plan", Indochina Report, No. 4 (Singapore: Information & Resource Center), October-December, 1985.
73. The first published by the publishing house of the Writers' Union branch in Ho Chi Minh City (nha xuat ban Van Nghe thanh pho Ho Chi Minh) and the second sponsored by the Women' Union publishing house (Phu Nu).
74. Nguyen thi Ngoc Tu, Hat Mua Sau, Hanoi: Thanh Nien, 1984. The literary renewal of this period will be officially praised later for ils initiative in confronting social and moral issues, cf. Bui Hien remark during the colloquy organized by Tap chi Cong San, on March 9, 1988 reprinted in Tap chi Cong San, April 1988, pp. 57-58.
75. The topic will be fully examined in a future paper, cf. note 68.
76. Cf. Duc Kon, San Khau, phe binh-tieu luan, (Ho Chi Minh City: Truong Nghe Thuat San Khau, 1986), pp. 152-161.
77. Cf. Sophie Quinn- Judge, "Life stirs in Vietnam's cowed literary world", FEER, February 27, 1986, pp. 3637.
78. Cf. notes 95, 96 below.
79. Van Nghe, January 17, 1987. 80.	Cf. note 52.
81.	Cf. note 11.
82. Pham The My, "De co tac pham lot", Saigon Giai Phong, May 4, 1986.
83.	Cf. note 52.
84. Cf. the literary commentary of Nam Chi, "Van nghe va Kinh te", Doan Ket (Paris), May 1988, pp. 25-26; with his pertinent remark on the pressures of economic hardship vis-a-vis the ordinary Vietnamese woman.
85. Nguyen Huy Thiep's short masterpiece appeared in Van Nghe, June 20,1987, and received many laudatory reviews from the enthusiastic critics and readers, cf. Van Nghe, September 5, and 12, 1987.
86. The most talked-about piece of literary reportage depicted the unhappy fate of an inventive technician whose lite and career were ruined because of bureaucratic interference, cf. Tran Huy Quang, "Loi khaicua bi can", Van Nghe, September 12, 1987. As famous as Quang's story, is Phung Gia Loc's grim description of the underdogs' existence in the countryside under the rule of the "lords", cf. "Cai dem hom ay ... dem gi?", Van Nghe, January 1988.
87. Cf. the commentary on the exhibit in Van Nghe, May 16, 1987.
88. A keen analysis of Thuy's films is written by a Vietnamese living in France, cf. Bao Tam, "1987: La Reconstitution du pays Reel", Doan Ket (Paris), May 1988, pp. 42-44.
89. Cf. the interview of Tran Quoc Vuong by the magazine Dat Viet (Canada), January 2, 1987, pp. 18-22. Cf. also Nguyen Hong Phong, 'Truyen thong va Hien dai", Dat Viet (Canada), November 1987, pp. 27-31.
90. Cf. Ha Van Tan, "Lich su, su that va su hoc", To Quoc, January 1, 1988.
91. A conference on "The National Character" was organized by the Institute of Educational Science and the participants' papers were reprinted in To Quoc, August 1987.
92. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, (New York: Doubleday Anchor Book, 1967), p. 123.
93.	ibid. p. 121.
94. There are plenty of orthodox legitimations of the Party's ideology, cf. for example Hoang Xuan Nhi, 'Tim hieu duong loi van nghe cua Dang" (Hanoi: VAn Hoc, 1975) and Hoang Trinh, Ha Minh Duc, Le Ba Han, Vu Duc Phuc, "Phan dau sang tao theo duong loi van nghe cua Dang (Hanoi: Su That, 1986).
95. The most outspoken critics of the ideological bureaucrats were Nguyen Dang Manh, "Phe binh van hoc trong tinh hinh moi", Van Nghe, August 29, 1987, Le Dinh Ky, "On cu de doi moi", Van Nghe, September 19, 1987, Nguyen Minh Chau cf, note 58, Nguyen Khac Vien cf. note 11, and Duong Thu Huong cf. note 56.
1
Oct-Dec 1990	Indochina Report 25
96. Such were the opinions of Hoang Ngoc Hien, Nguyen Khai, Ta Van Thanh, La Nguyen during the round table discussion organized by the literary review of the Writers' Union, cf. Van Nghe, February 27, 1988.
97. Cf. Hoang Phu Ngoc Tuong, "Tra loi ban doc Tuoi Tre", Tuoi Tre, August 30, 1987. 98. Cf. Nguyen Khai, "May loi noi lai va noi them", Van Nghe, March 12, 1988.
99. Once again, Nguyen Khac Vien is the most demanding of the cultural elite, cf. note 11. The writer Nguyen Ngoc, new chief editor of Van Nghe, seems also very concerned about the rehabilitation of his unfortunate colleagues, cf. "Du bao va nhap cuoc", Tuoi Tre, October 24, 1987.
100. Le Thi, "Tu duy triet hoc va doi moi tu duy", Tap chi Cong San, August 1987, p. 25.
101. Cf. the academic contributions to the philosophical conference organized by the editorial board of the Party theoretical review in Tap chi Cong San, October and December 1987.
102. Nguyen Ngoc Long, "Nang luc tu duy ly luan trong qua trinh doi moi tu duy", Tap chi Cong San, October 1987, p. 51.
103. Ho Van Thong, "Mot so van de ve tu duy va doi moi tu duy o muoc ta", Tap chi Cong San, October 1987, p. 34.
104. Cf. the editorial in Tap chi Cong San, January 1988, commenting on the new Party artistic and cultural policy. 105. ibid. p. 22.
106. Cf. FEER Asia 1988 Yearbook, p. 252.
107. Cf. Doan Ket, Paris, October 1987, "Interviewing Nguyen Khac Vien", p. 29. 108. Cf. Dat Viet Canada, April 1987, "Interviewing Vo Van Kiet", p. 25. 109. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, op. cit., p. 40-41. 110. Cf. Saigon Giai Phong, January 8, 1988," Interviewing Phan Khac Tu".
111. Cf. Le Duc Tiet, "Xay dung va hoan chinh phap luar, Tap chi Cong San, September.1987, pp. 40-43 and Le Quang Thanh, "Xay dung con nguoi moi voi van de phong ngua su pham toi", Tap chi Cong San, May 1987, pp. 76-78.
112. Radio Hanoi on March 23, 1988 announced the dismissal of Ha Trong Hoa, the Party secretary of Thanh Hoa and member of the Central Committee. This event indicated a stronger resolution from the reformera to purity the system.
113. Cf. note 107.
114. Cf. the details of the concealment in the editorial of Doan Ket, June 1988, pp. 6-8. In an interview with the writer of this paper, the prize-awarded novelist Le Luu recognized the unresolved conflict among the members of the Writers' Union. According to him, the postponement of the Writers' Congress was due to conservative and orthodox forces hostile to the reassessment of past ideological errors. Luu has also observed that up to August 1988, no agreement has been reached between the contending parties. For this reason, the Fourth Writers' Congress, scheduled for July 1988, is stil pending. (Interview with Le Luu, August 11, 1988 at the University of Massachusetts, Harbor Gallery).
115. S. Frederidc Starr, "Soviet Union: A Civil Society", Foreign Policy, No. 70, Spring 1988, p. 39. 116. Cf. Tran Bach Dang, "Yeu va Gher, Thanh Nien, December 10, 1988.
117. Cf. for example Ly Chanh Trung in Sai Gon Giai Phong, September 13,1988 and Lu Phong in Song Huong, March-April 1989.
118. As evidenced by the outspoken debate during the Third Congress of the Patriotic Front during the first week of November 1988 in Ha Noi, preceded by the critical Congress of the Ho Chi Minh City branch of the same Front in September 23-24,1988.
119. Cf. note 114. 120. Cf. note 86.
121. Hoai is attacked on behalf of her short story "Nam Ngay" in Van Nghe, July 30, 1988 presenting a sexually unorthodox attitude. Pham Tiet by Nguyen Huy Thiep is condemned because ils defiant author has committed the supreme crime of lese-majeste in depicting a great national herô s foibles, cf. Van Nghe, July 16, 1988.
122. Cf. Tuoi Tre, September 22, 1988 and Song Huong, September-October 1988.
123. The famous poet is Bui Minh Quoc, editor-in-chief of Liang Bian, the literary review of Lam Dong province. Quoc will subsequently be fired, cf. Song Huong, March-April 1989, p. 96. He will also Jase his Party membership.
124. Cf. especially Song Huong, March-April 1989 and Song Huong, August-September 1989 which publish dissenting articles by Lu Phuong, Lai Nguyen An, and Ha Si Phu.
125. Cf. Doan Ket (Paris), October 1989, p. 34 for the full enumeration of Vietnamese newspapers and magazines victims of the cradcdown.
126. Cf. Nhan Dan, August 29, 1989.
127. ibid. Nguyen Van Linh's speech at the Seventh Plenum explicitly warned against the danger of scepticism and nihilism which are undermining Party members' faith in ils doctrine.
128. Nguyen Khac Vien who is familiar with the inner intrigues of VCP has remarked on many occasions that the General Secretary has not succeeded in his efforts to re-organize the Party apparatus and to dismantle the
Indochina Report 26	Oct-Dec 1990
privileged officialism. Cf. Lao Dong (New Year Issue), January 1990,.cf. also note 113 and Doan Ket (Paris),
February-March 1990, pp. 57-58 interviewing with Vien.
129. As record events have made it dear, Linh not only betrayed the nation's expectations but also took the most reactionary stance in supporting Cuba, North Korea and China. Cf. Quan Doi Nhan Dan, June 15, 1990.
130. Cf. note 114.
131. Revealed in a samizdat publication of Truyen Thong, information about the Congress were communicated to Vietnamese overseas publications such as Van Hoc (California), April 1990.
132. Cf. Nhan Dan, January 6, 1990.
133. Cf. Eglises d Asie, issues of June and July 1990 and Doan Ket (Paris), May 1990, p. 42.
134. In his speech of February 2, 1990 in Ha Noi commemorating the VCP's sixty years anniversary, Linh was stressing the regime's effort to promote more democracy and civil rights.
135. Truyen Thong was quite popular in overseas communities in France and the United States thanks to its advertising by Doan Ket (Paris), Van Hoc (California) and other publications in Canada and West Germany.
136. Cf. articles by Tran Xuan Bach, Le Quang Dao illegally published by CVR's information bulletin, December 1989 and re-published by Doan Ket (Paris), February 1990.
137. Cf. Eglises d Asie, note 133, and Que Me (Paris), February 1990.
138. The reluctant regime has finally recognised the legal existence of the Vietnamese Veterans Association, a long-debated issue raised by CVR.
139. Cf. note 129.
Oct-Dec 1990	Indochina Report 27
0 wing to the closed nature of the political system operating in Vietnam, decision-makers, scholars and businessmen who study or deal with Vietnam and its leaders have labored under gross misconceptions, often bordering on ignorance, about the workings of the system, the mindset of Hanoi's leaders, the state of its economy, the character of its society and the nature of its links with ils Soviet patrons. Conditions in Vietnam's client states, Laos and Cambodia, are even more grossly misunderstood.

The first report on Indochina to be published in Asia, Indochina Report filhs the gap in the outside world's knowledge of the arcane world of Indochinese politics. Each issue of this quarterly publication looks behind signal developments in one of the three countries to discem key trends, explain events and assess their implications for the rest of Southeast Asia. It is hoped that the insights that Indochina Report presents will contribute in a small way to the efforts of building equilibrium and peace in Southeast Asia. Contributors to Indochina Report are specialists on Indochina who are largely based in the region and who have had extensive firsthand experience and knowledge of the three Indochinese countries. Occasionally, respected en-tigres write invaluable "insider" accounts of the processes at work in these societies. Launched in 1984, Indochina Report is now read by, among others, govemment leaders, senior foreign policy analysts, diplomats, academics, journalists, students of Indochinese affairs, and even policy-makers in Hanoi.
Editorial Advisory Board for Indochina Report and Vietnam Connnentary:
Jacqueline Desbarats
niversity of California, Berkeley, USA

Dougias Pike
Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, USA

Stephen Marris
Harvard University, Boston; Naval War College, Rhode Island, USA
Bui Xuan Quais
Universite de Paris - Nanterre, France
Lan: Tlmnh Lien,
Laboratoire "Analyse de l'Espace", CNRS, Paris, France
Zakaria 1-1aji Alunad
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Ton Tlrat Thien
Universite du Quebec, Trois Rivieres, Canada
Olivier Todd Paris, France
Tertio Tonooki
Strategic Institute for Southeast Asia, Tokyo, Japan

Alvin Bernstein
Naval War College, Rhode Island, USA

Kltien Theeravit
Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand
Chou Norindr Paris, France
Sponsoring Institutions:
lnstituteof Asian Studies
Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand

Institute de Politique Internationale et Europeene - GRESASE, Universite de Paris - Nanterre France
Strategic Institute for Southeast Asia Tokyo, Japan

Information & Resource Center Singapore
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lndochirra Report is owned and published on a quarterly basis by the Information & Resource Center Pte-Ltd, which also publishes Vietnarrr Conrnrerrfary and Manila Report. Editorial Office: Information & Resource Center Pte Ltd, 6 Nassim Road, Singapore 1025. Printed by Hong Fatt Press, Singapore. Reproduction of Indochina Report or any part thereof without the publisher's permission is strictly forbidden. Quotation with attribution is encouraged.